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The main aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate Auckland Council’s approach 
in revoking the provisions of inclusionary zoning from the Auckland Unitary Plan 
that sought to secure affordable housing. Auckland’s major housing affordability 
problem has received a lot of attention at the national, regional and local level. 
Review of international literature suggests that there are various mechanisms to 
secure affordable housing using planning principles. One of these mechanisms is 
inclusionary zoning, which requires land developers to dedicate a certain 
percentage of the total number of dwellings in a development for affordable units. 
This mechanism can be implemented by land developers constructing the units 
and imposing a retention mechanism or by transferring the units or land to a 
community housing provider. 
This thesis examines the provisions of inclusionary zoning that were part of the 
Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan from three dimensions; legislative, economic 
and socio-cultural. In order to combat the problem of affordable housing, the New 
Zealand government introduced legislation specifically to address this matter but 
this either was repealed or had short timeframes to undertake developments under 
the legislation. This research uncovered that inclusionary zoning is not new to 
New Zealand. Queenstown Lakes District Council has implemented it in the past 
but could not withstand the political challenges. Primary data was collected 
through interviews with four key stakeholders who play an active part in the 
provision of affordable housing either by administering it or delivering it on 
ground. 
The critical evaluation and analysis of the primary and secondary data revealed 
that the provisions of inclusionary zoning in the Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan 
have worked to secure affordable housing, to a certain extent. But there are many 
opportunities, as recommended in this thesis, to increase the supply of affordable 
housing units through inclusionary zoning within the current legislation. One of 
the research findings was that while implementing inclusionary zoning in 
brownfield areas was more complex than that of greenfield areas, it did not prove 
to be economically unviable. This research also concluded that inclusionary 
zoning is an effective tool to encourage socially integrated developments which 
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1. Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A key topic of debate in recent years all over New Zealand is shortage of housing. 
Housing is a basic necessity for human beings and it is important to have quality 
housing within affordable means. There has been a steep rise in housing prices in 
the last decade in major cities of New Zealand (MBIE, 2013 cited in Spencer 
2014). Auckland, where the land value has doubled and tripled between 2000 and 
2012 (Spencer 2014), is one of them. There are very few days in recent times that 
the media has not published news in relation to the housing crisis in Auckland. 
According to Statistics New Zealand, Auckland is home to nearly one-third of the 
population of New Zealand. There has been an increase in population in Auckland 
for the past 10 years (New Zealand Productivity Commission 2012)  and this is 
expected to grow even more in the next 30 years (Auckland Council 2012). With 
this trend in place it is important that housing is provided to everyone who resides 
in Auckland. Increasing housing supply to meet demand is one of the priorities 
identified in the Auckland Plan (Auckland Council 2012). 
The Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey placed Auckland as 
the  13th least affordable out of 360 cities surveyed (Gibson 2014). Further, 
Auckland has been rated as severely unaffordable in all 11 surveys conducted by 











Fig. 1: Housing affordability trends in the three major cities of New Zealand in the last 10 years 
                                                                                                        Source: Cox and Pavletich (2015) 
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In the Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan, Auckland Council adopted the concept of 
retained affordable housing1 but this was revoked by the Independent Hearings 
Panel later. The retained affordable housing provisions introduce inclusionary 
zoning (Auckland Council 2013e). Part of this research is to critique the methods 
adopted by Auckland Council, that were revoked, to implement affordable 
housing through inclusionary zoning and also to consider these from a developer’s 
perspective. 
1.2 Research Question 
This research will be guided by the main objective as stated below: 
“Critically evaluate the approach Auckland Council has taken to address the 
housing affordability issue in revoking the provisions for inclusionary zoning in 
the Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan.”   
In order to give more insight to the main research objective, there are a set of 
questions formulated as follows: 
1. To what extent will the current legislation support inclusionary zoning? 
2. What are the economic impacts that developers face with inclusionary 
zoning? 
3. To what extent will inclusionary zoning result in better socio-cultural 
outcome? 
1.3 Format of the research 
This research is presented in five chapters 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter gives a background of the research and briefs the problem statement 
and the research question.  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter discusses the basic concepts of housing affordability and 
inclusionary zoning. Integrating these concepts to form a strong framework will 
                                                 
1 Retained Affordable Housing: 
Housing that is: 
•sold or rented at or below the price as defined below 




form the basis of discussion in Chapter 4. A developer’s economic view and 
socio-cultural impacts of inclusionary zoning from an international perspective 
will also be discussed in this chapter. Further, in-depth insight will be provided on 
the historical housing reforms undertaken in New Zealand and the current 
measures adopted by Auckland Council.  
Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
This chapter details the methods used in this research for the collection of primary 
and secondary data. It also details how the required information has been obtained 
and how it was used to draw conclusions.  
Chapter 4: Presentation of data and analysis  
This chapter analyses and presents the information gathered from literature 
review, interviews from various stakeholders and other secondary data.   
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
Based on the analysis, this final chapter concludes by answering the sub-questions 
stated in Chapter 1 and develops recommendations to provide some solutions to 
utilize inclusionary zoning policies to secure more affordable housing in New 




2. Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction to chapter 
This chapter provides insight into provisions of affordable housing and 
inclusionary zoning. The first section talks about the basic definition and concepts 
relating to affordable housing and inclusionary zoning, and the theoretical 
framework binding these two concepts. This section further details the history of 
housing in New Zealand and the current reforms that are in place to tackle the 
housing affordability problem. The next section considers the concept of land 
value capture and its usage in different countries. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with the concept of social inclusion through inclusionary zoning.    
2.2 Concept of Affordable Housing 
The concept of affordable housing is vast and ambiguous. The term ‘affordability’ 
can be interpreted in many ways. It should also be noted that ‘affordability’ 
depends on the scale it is considered at, such as national, regional or local. As this 
thesis mostly revolves around the concept of affordable housing and its programs, 
a definition is necessary. 
‘Affordable housing’ is said to be achieved if a household acquires a unit (own or 
rent) for an amount of up to 30 percent of the household income (Miles et al. 2000 
cited in Susilawati and Armitage 2004).  
While this is the basic definition, Auckland Regional Affordable Housing 
Strategy 2003 has an amended version. The definition reads; 
“Housing is considered to be affordable if households can access suitable 
and adequate housing by spending a maximum of 30% of their gross 
income.” 
      (Auckland Regional Council 2003 9) 
This strategy mainly focuses on the ‘suitable and adequate’ nature of housing 
provided to the bottom four deciles of household income. Suitable and adequate 
housing is better explained by considering the aspects that are involved in the 
design and construction of housing, such as the materials used, energy efficiency 
and safety of the neighborhood. Apart from this, consideration should also be 
given to facilities in the vicinity of the neighborhood such as transport and 
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community and recreational facilities, as these play a major role in calculating the 
household income threshold to determine housing affordability. Brown (2001 1) 
also supports that affordable housing units need to be strategically located where 
households will have easy means of “access to a range of opportunities – from 
good jobs and schools to transportation and safe streets.” 
New Zealand’s Affordable Housing Enabling Territorial Authorities Act (2008 s. 
4) defines affordable housing as; 
…… means housing that— 
(a) is for persons living in households that— 
(i) have low to moderate income; and 
(ii) have no, low, or moderate legal or beneficial interests 
in property; and 
(b) is priced so that the persons are able to meet— 
(i) their housing costs; and 
(ii) their other essential basic living costs 
This definition from the Affordable Housing Enabling Territorial Authorities Act 
2008 focuses mainly on the income status of the households and little detail about 
the criteria for low and moderate income is mentioned. Notwithstanding the first 
part of the definition, this act takes into account  the housing costs as well as other 
essential living costs that add up to the economic aspect of affordable housing. 
Affordable housing can also be defined in a few other ways; 
“Affordable housing is housing that is appropriate for the needs of a 
range of very low to moderate income households and priced so that these 
households are also able to meet other basic living costs such as food, 
clothing, transport, medical care and education.”      
                     (NSW Government 2015) 
The Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan (PAUP) has amended the term ‘affordable 
housing’ to ‘retained affordable housing’ and this is defined in the following way; 
“Housing that is: 
•      sold or rented at or below the price as defined below 
• owned or rented by occupiers who meet the relevant development 
controls in perpetuity. 
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Price in the case of  retained affordable housing means: 
1. Dwellings must be sold or rented at a rate that means households 
on 80 to 120 per cent of the median household income for Auckland spend 
no more than 30 per cent of their gross income on rent or mortgage 
repayments, where:  
a. median household income shall be determined by reference to 
Statistics New Zealand 
b. in the case of purchase, normal bank lending criteria shall apply, 
and shall at a minimum be based on a 10 per cent deposit, a 30 year loan 
term and the average published interest rate of the 4 main trading banks. 
Body Corporate or Resident Society fees may be included in the 
calculation of purchase costs. 
c. rent shall be the monthly rent set out in a tenancy agreement under 
the Residential Tenancies Act. 
2. Purchase prices or rental of houses may be increased by 5 per cent 
where: 
a. The dwellings have been certified as providing superior energy 
efficiency achieving at least 7 star level of the New Zealand Green 
Building Council Homestar Tool 2013 or an equivalent rating, and 
b. are located within 200m of a bus, train or ferry service with 
greater than one hour frequency during off-peak times, i.e. between 9am 
and 3pm. 
3. Where the development involves vacant site subdivision only, the 
price of the sites identified for Retained Affordable Housing must not 
exceed a price such that the resulting dwelling plus the site will be unable 
to meet the price set out above. 
4. Where the development involves apartment units (vertically joined 
units), then the affordability of units is to be based on the value per m² of 
floor space. This value should be determined by dividing the price of the 
unit determined by the formula in clause 1 above, by 80m².” 
           (Auckland Council 2013b) 
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The PAUP has added a new dimension to the definition of affordable housing. 
The Auckland Regional Affordable Housing Strategy’s main focus of ‘access 
suitable and adequate housing’ has been better explained in the PAUP by 
considering energy efficient buildings accredited by the New Zealand Green 
Building Council and also taking into  account  the location of the dwellings close 
to transport facilities.  
The PAUP’s definition of retained affordable housing will be considered for the 
purpose of this research. This definition has been adopted to guide this research 
for three reasons. Firstly, this definition establishes a connection between 
household income and housing costs that provides a quantified affordability 
measure. Secondly, this definition directs the territorial authority to consider 
quality of life by using techniques such as Homestar rating. Thirdly, since this 
definition was developed for the Auckland region it considers important aspects 
that contribute to affordable housing. 
2.3 The Concept of Inclusionary Zoning 
There are many different tools or mechanisms through which affordable housing 
can be delivered. One of them is through Inclusionary Zoning. The main point of 
interest in this research revolves around the concept of inclusionary zoning so as 
to critically evaluate the approach Auckland Council has taken to provide 
affordable housing through inclusionary zoning.  
Williams (2000 297) defines Inclusionary Zoning as 
“….zoning provisions which require the mandatory provision of certain 
uses or facilities in identified new development proposals as a 
precondition before any approval may be granted by a planning 
authority.” 
This definition is adopted for this research as it clearly links to the approach 
Auckland Council has planned to take through the PAUP.  
Burchell and Galley (2000) identifies the “fundamental purpose of inclusionary 
zoning is to allow the development of affordable housing to become an integral 
part of other development taking place in a community.” Auckland Council 
through the Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan aimed to achieve this concept so that 
8 
 
affordable housing could be a part of large development carried out by the 
developer.    
The other important aspect of inclusionary zoning is to create socially integrated 
communities. Calavita and Mallach (2010 1) describe inclusionary zoning as a 
means to encourage social integration in a community by also considering the 
planning regulations to achieve affordable housing. This element of social 
inclusion plays a vital role which will be detailed at a later stage of the research. 
Meda (2009) supports this concept by explaining the two main objectives that 
drive inclusionary zoning: 
a) To provide affordable housing. 
b) To integrate different classes of people based on their income. 
It is a general policy that the inclusionary zoning technique allocates a set 
minimum amount of units that need to be affordable through planning regulations. 
This is generally defined by considering the median household income for that 
particular region/area (Burchell and Galley 2000). Auckland Council adopted this 
approach by incorporating regulations in the PAUP that required developments of 
15 or more dwelling to ensure that at least 10% of these dwellings to be 
affordable. (Auckland Council 2013c).  
Inclusionary zoning is implemented by residential developers who provide 
affordable housing as a percentage of total units in a development, selling or 
renting them to households whose incomes fall below specified income ceilings at 
prices or rents they can afford. This is achieved through regulatory directives 
(such as consent conditions), or through incentives such as density bonuses 
(Calavita and Mallach 2010).   
2.4 Evolution of Inclusionary Zoning 
The term ‘Inclusionary Zoning’ is an American concept that was adopted 
primarily by government agencies during the early 1970s. This later spread across 
Canada, Western Europe, India and South Africa. One of the main reasons for the 
emergence of this tool was to avoid racial and income segregation of low-income 
families and to integrate this with land use regulation, which is otherwise known 
as exclusionary zoning. Research reveals that the term inclusionary zoning was 
coined in contrast with the former term (Calavita and Mallach 2010 2). The US 
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County of Fairfax, Virginia was the first to enact inclusionary zoning as a 
mechanism and was later followed by many US cities and counties, 
predominantly in California (Meda 2009 160). 
Apart from the US experience, inclusionary zoning has also spread to Canada and 
Western Europe. In Canada, it was difficult to attain affordable housing through 
planning regulations because of the absence of national housing policy (Meda 
2009 162). In 1993 the federal government stopped funding for social housing and 
transferred the responsibility to provide social housing to the provinces. Mah 
(2009) suggests that where there is limited public funding, the concept of 
inclusionary zoning will be helpful to deliver affordable housing. 
The concept of inclusionary zoning was not implemented in Europe until the 
1990s. The direct involvement of the public sector to create affordable housing is 
one of the reasons for the late implementation of inclusionary zoning in Europe. 
This concept was considered after the European social housing programmes were 
significantly reduced (Meda 2009 163).         
2.5 Theoretical concepts on Affordable Housing  
Following on from the definition and concept of Affordable Housing, it is 
important to consider the measures of housing affordability. There are several 
parameters that determine and measure housing affordability. They are; income, 
house price,  rents, and mortgage payments (DTZ New Zealand 2004 cited in 
Robinson et al. 2006 4).  
The measure of housing affordability can be classified into two types; the Ratio 
Measures approach and the Residual Measures approach (Robinson et al. 2006). 
The Ratio Measures approach, also called the shelter first approach, claims that 
expenditure on housing takes the top priority in a household budget and the other 
expenditure comes later. On the contrary, the Residual Measures approach, also 
called the  non-shelter first approach, is where the expenditure on housing comes 
second to the other expenditure (Robinson et al. 2006 5).  Of these two 
approaches, the Ratio Measures approach is used most commonly. For the 
purpose of this research the concept of the Ratio Measures approach is considered, 




2.6 Ratio Measures Approach  
This approach is the most commonly used approach internationally by housing 
policy analysts. This approach determines the usage of household budget on 
housing expenditure. This ratio can be defined as “the ratio of current 
median/mean market value of standard housing unit to median/mean (either 
before tax or disposable) income of the household.”(Chen et al.2010 cited in Yao 
2011 22). In simple terms this approach assumes that an increase in household 
expenditure is directly proportional to an increase in income by keeping the 
percentage of expenditure on housing constant (Gabriel et al. 2005 19). This 
approach can be differentiated into three types; 
a) Simple ‘housing cost to income’ ratio 
b) Fixed ratio with benchmark 
c) Refined ratio measures   (Gabriel et al. 2005 22) 
The simple ‘housing cost to income’ ratio is a straightforward approach where the 
ratio of median house prices to median household incomes are calculated at 
different time intervals and then  assessed  to see whether  the affordability 
situation is improving or worsening (Gabriel et al. 2005 22). Research indicates 
that while this ratio is used to track shifts in affordability with less parameters, 
this ratio is not in policymaking as only single measure tenure is applied across all 
tenures, locations and house types. This ratio also does not consider the quality of 
housing and housing density (Gabriel et al. 2005 24).  
The fixed ratio measure approach can be considered for policy making, as this 
approach sets a benchmark to consider whether a household is affordable or 
unaffordable. Households are said to be unaffordable if the housing costs of a 
household are more than the determined threshold (Gabriel et al. 2005 23). This 
approach is closely related to the approach Auckland Council has undertaken as 
part of the Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan (PAUP). One of the pre-requisites for 
affordable housing, as defined in the PAUP, is that 
 Dwellings must be sold or rented at a rate that means households on 80 to 
120 per cent of the median household income for Auckland spend no more 
than 30 per cent of their gross income on rent or mortgage repayments…         
           (Auckland Council 2013b)       
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It can be noted that Auckland has set a benchmark level of 30% of the gross 
income on rent or mortgage payments to be considered affordable or not. This 
benchmark is consistent with the approach taken by other nations worldwide 
including United States, Canada, and Australia.   
There are a few advantages with the Ratio Measures approach. They include; 
 This method requires fewer variables/parameters to determine the shift in 
affordability. 
 With minimal jargon involved in understanding this approach, it becomes 
easy to explain to non-experts. 
 The measure relies on transparent and apparently objective variables, with 
limited subjective assumptions about individuals’ housing and non-
housing consumption.  
(Gabriel et al. 2005 24) 
While there are advantages, this approach has also faced criticism, such as:  
 This approach does not take into consideration the effect of expenditure on 
housing on the general household income (such as expenditure on health, 
clothing and food) (Gabriel et al. 2005 19). 
 Bogdon and Can (1997) argues that it is unfair to set a benchmark standard 
as some households may be willing to spend more than the threshold 
which classifies them to be in the unaffordable zone. 
 This approach cannot be generalized to all households as  housing and 
non-housing expenditure  varies among different households (Stone 2006). 
2.7 Residual Measures Approach 
This approach was the outcome of the criticism faced by the ratio approach. Ratio 
Measures approach identified that an approach should take into account not only 
expenditure on housing but also meeting basic non-housing expenditure. It is 
during this time that the concept of the Residual Measures approach emerged. 
Under this approach, housing is said to be affordable if the income after housing 
meets the other non- housing expenditure (Gabriel et al. 2005 19). Stone (2006) 
suggests that the difference between housing costs and income is an indicator to 
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establish a relationship between them. This difference is the residual income left 
after paying for housing.  
Stone (2006) identifies that in considering this approach the size of household also 
has equal weight to that of housing costs and income. He further explains this 
clearly by providing two examples with households of different sizes but the same 
income. The household with the smaller size will have less non-housing costs 
when compared to the household of larger size. This means that the larger 
household will have less cost to spend on housing. On the other hand, he also 
considered a case of same household size but different after tax income. It was 
explained that the non-housing costs will remain the same, as the household size 
is the same but there will be a difference in percentage of allocation to costs of 
housing. Households with less income can afford to spend less cost on housing 
when compared to the household with higher income. Stone (2006) concludes 
stating that  
….the residual income standard emerges as a sliding scale of housing 
affordability with the maximum affordable amount and fraction of income 
varying with household size, type, and income.  
Most researchers believe that the residual measure approach has an edge over the 
ratio measure approach as there is more accurate information provided in the 
former for different household types (Gabriel et al. 2005 26). It is also believed 
that since the residual measure approach takes into account the non-housing costs 
it provides an opportunity for housing subsidies (Stone 2006 cited in Yao 2011).  
Even though this approach provides us with detailed analyses of the housing costs  
versus non-housing costs, many researches prefer the ratio measures approach 
over the residual measures approach due to the complexity involved in defining 
the measurement criteria for the latter approach (Burke et al. 2004 cited in Gabriel 
et al. 2005). There can be points drawn from each of the approaches when 
Auckland’s case is considered. The benchmark concept of the ratio measures 
approach can be integrated with the expenditure-income concept of the residual 
approach measure. It will be worthwhile to have a policy that sets housing 
affordability benchmarks for each different range of income groups rather than 
having one benchmark standard (35%) for all income groups.      
13 
 
2.8 Theoretical concept on Inclusionary Zoning 
The above section dealt with theoretical approaches that are related solely to 
affordable housing. This section deals with a concept that is part of inclusionary 
zoning implementation.  
The economics of residential zoning can be best explained through Egalitarian’s 
market theory. For most of this theory’s literature, the work of Andrew Dietderich 
is adopted. 
Dietderich (1996) in his article focuses on the methods of achieving affordable 
housing through Inclusionary Zoning. He classified these methods into three 
types; 
 Voluntary inclusion programmmes: This is a programme where 
developers will have no obligation to set aside dwellings/units for 
affordable housing. Under this programme the developer, at their will, 
may allocate certain number of units to be sold at a less than market 
value.   
 Mandatory set-asides with density bonuses: In this approach, it is 
mandatory for developers to set aside a required amount of 
dwellings/units for affordability purposes. This will enable an 
opportunity for developers to receive a density bonus for that 
development.  
 Mandatory set-asides without density bonuses: This is a similar 
approach to the above but the only difference would be the developer 
would not have the perk of no density limit.  
Auckland Council, in the PAUP, adopted the mandatory set-aside with density 
bonuses approach. This approach was only considered for ‘qualifying 
developments’ proposed under the Housing Accord and Special Housing Areas 
Act2.    
Dietderich (1996 69) identifies the effect of adopting the mandatory set-asides 
with density bonuses approach. He states one of the reasons for the developers 
opposing this approach is that by following the mandatory set-asides they are 
                                                 
2 Literature regarding the Housing Accord and Special Housing Areas Act is discussed in section 
2.12 of this chapter. 
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limited to the sale price of the dwelling/unit which in turn affects their short run 
revenue. This loss in revenue is interlinked with the supply of homes as this will 
be affected as the developers lack confidence in achieving their profit and 
increases their risk. 
Dietderich (1996 75) puts forward an interesting statement that it is a false notion 
that the developer is only looking for profit made with the increase in density. He 
states that part of the developer’s aim is also to have goodwill in the community. 
By increasing the density and providing intensified housing in an area of low-
density houses, the developer does not want to lose the goodwill of the officials or 
community residents.  
The other concern Dietderich indicates is passing on the costs of the inclusionary 
units to non-inclusionary units. The developer has little chance to demand more 
for non-inclusionary units if the housing price for such kind of dwellings/units is 
uniform within the vicinity of the neighborhood. But if a development has an edge 
on any feature such as good transport access to the site or aesthetic views, the 
developer has every opportunity to transfer the costs of inclusionary units onto the 
non-inclusionary units (Dietderich 1996 77). Even though affordable housing is 
provided through inclusionary zoning in this case, the objective of the approach 
will not be met and the affordability issue still continues.  
The following table considers the key points of this approach against their 
adoption in the PAUP. 
Table 1: Inclusionary zoning provisions in the PAUP 
Key Points PAUP relevance  
Setting aside a certain 
percentage of any new 
developments for 
affordable housing 
Rule H6.6.1.1 (1) of the PAUP requires that 10% of 
total dwellings in a new development must be set 
aside for retained affordable housing. This only 
applies where a new development contains more than 
15 dwellings or creates more than 15 vacant sites.   
Density bonus  Rule I1.3.1 (6) of the PAUP states that in the Mixed 
Housing Urban Zone no density limit applies if four 
or more dwellings are proposed on the site. Site 
restrictions apply to qualify for this rule. This is to 
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ensure overall good urban design is maintained in the 
neighborhood.  
Controlling the resale 
price of the 
inclusionary stock 
Rule H6.6.3.1 (d) (iv) of the PAUP requires all 
resource consent applications involving the provision 
of retained affordable housing to provide details of 
the proposed retention mechanism. One way to 
achieve this is by registering a covenant on the 
certificate of title of the site that identifies it as 
subject to retained affordable housing.  
2.9 History of Housing in New Zealand  
There has been a drastic increase in house prices in New Zealand in the last 30 
years, especially in Auckland where the house prices have increased fourfold from 
1992 to 2013 (Goodyear and Fabian 2014 54). Bassett and Malpass (2013) argue 
that housing affordability should not be seen from an economic perspective but 
also from cultural value of homeownership. They noted that New Zealand’s low 
level of poverty among elderly people is partly because of the high levels of 
homeownership that occurred when the house prices were low. With the current 
position it is difficult for many, including younger generations, to own a property 
in places like Auckland where the house prices are on an all time high.     
There has been a shortfall of housing construction, coupled with increasing 
population making it more and more difficult to accommodate this increase. 
Bassett and Malpass (2013) lists out key trends resulting in a low rate of 
construction of dwellings, since the 1970s. One of them is the slowing down of 
the economy, which in turn left government money less available for construction 
of houses for first-home buyers. This has been contributing to an ongoing 
shortage of houses where Auckland requires 13,000 new homes to be built every 
year to cope with the increasing population (Auckland Council 2012). The other 
key trend pointed out by Bassett and Malpass was the rate of increase in floor area 
of the dwellings since 1974 to 2008. Since the abolition of the system of State 
Advances in the late 1970s, houses were built to higher specifications with larger 
floor areas (New Zealand Productivity Commission 2012 42). In comparison with 
other countries, New Zealand’s houses are the largest in the world, on the basis of 
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an average floor area. In the recent years there has been an increase in four and 
five bedroom dwellings when compared with dwellings in the 1960s which were 
mostly three bedroom units (New Zealand Productivity Commission 2012 42 & 
43).   
 
Fig. 2: Floor area per new dwelling consented between 1974 and 2010 
                                     Source: Statistics New Zealand cited in Bassett and Malpass (2013 14) 
Following are the series of events that happened in New Zealand in relation to 
housing since 1919 to date; 
Housing Act 1919 
This was the first Act that provided housing for workers3 and made further 
provision for Housing of the People. Under this Act, the then Governor-General 
could set aside land for erecting dwellings for workers which are not reserved for 
any other purpose by the Crown. There were restrictions on the income of workers 
when a dwelling was planned to be disposed of. 
Town Planning Act 1926 
This was the first Act that controlled the use of land through zoning principles. 
The concept of zoning was new to New Zealand and the concept was used to 
separate residential areas from industrial areas, a mechanism which was more 
prevalent in the USA and UK. While local authorities were given power to 
prepare Planning Schemes, authority was still retained by central government to 
                                                 
3 “Worker” includes any person employed in any capacity in any industry or calling, whether by an 
employer or on his own account Housing Act 1919. 
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approve the scheme and  subsequent changes (New Zealand Productivity 
Commission 2015a 4). This Act was not successful as there was lack of 
resources/planners required to prepare Planning Schemes (Bassett and Malpass 
2013 10). 
Between 1926 - 1950 
The housing rules were initiated by central government rather than local 
authorities. During this period, central government attempted to delegate powers 
to local authorities regarding housing rules pertaining to a region. 
Town and Country Planning Act 1953 
This Act recognized the importance of town planning for the better and 
disciplined growth of a region. The Act required every city, borough, and town 
board to provide and maintain a district planning scheme. Each planning authority 
was responsible for the preparation and approval of its planning scheme (powers 
previously exercised by the Town-Planning Board). There was still significant 
central government involvement, however as councils had to submit their 
prepared scheme to the Minister of Works for checking (New Zealand 
Productivity Commission 2015a 7). Even though there was no direct mention of 
increase in housing for the people, zoning and control of subdivision were listed 
in the matters the district planning scheme was required to make provision for. 
Mid 1950s 
This is the period when District Schemes had taken effect and anyone who 
planned to develop their property with a dwelling that breached the basic 
requirements such as maximum height and building setbacks needed to get 
permission from the local authority. Some sanitary requirements were also 
introduced. 
Town and Country Planning Act 1977 
This Act mainly focused on a higher scale of environmental effects and links 






Resource Management Act 1991 
This Act was a radical shift in the history of planning legislation in New Zealand. 
This Act replaced the past British style Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and 
replaced it with a different form of environmental planning and management 
(New Zealand Productivity Commission 2015a 10). 
2.10 Housing reforms after 1991  
There were social housing policy reforms introduced between 1991 and 1999. 
One of them was the introduction of the Accommodation Supplement.  
“The Accommodation Supplement is designed to provide supplementary 
income support for low income earners and beneficiaries who cannot 
afford accommodation appropriate to their family size on their current 
income.”  
                            (Luxton 1991) 
The Accommodation Supplement was introduced irrespective of tenure and based 
on household incomes, housing costs and regional caps. This replaced all other 
subsidies such as the government subsidy to local councils to provide pensioner 
housing. The Accommodation Supplement is more of an income supplement 
rather than a housing allowance that is available for either renting or home-
ownership costs.   
Several housing policies were introduced between 1999 and 2008 at a local and 
national level. The year 2003 saw the introduction of the Auckland Regional 
Affordable Housing Strategy. The two main goals of this strategy are; 
 “To enable all households in the Auckland Region to live in housing that 
is affordable 
 To encourage affordable housing that is well-located, appropriate to 
needs, well designed, integrated into communities, and provides for 
people’s need for choice, security, safety, and good health.” 
                                                                        (Auckland Regional Council 2003 4) 
Through this Housing Strategy there were Action Areas identified to support the 
two goals. The first two Action Areas are more relevant to this research than the 
other Action Areas. Action Area One aims to support initiatives that will make 
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housing more affordable and accessible. One of the tools identified to achieve this 
is through District Plans (Auckland Regional Council 2003 5). It has taken a 
decade to implement the strategy in the new Auckland Unitary Plan.  
Action Area Two aims to contribute to initiatives which will increase the supply 
of “social housing” and help to diversify the range of social housing options. One 
of the initiatives to achieve this is by inclusionary zoning. Auckland City Council 
identified this mechanism but were unsuccessful in implementing it as they feared 
a legal challenge that it did not fit within the Resource Management Act 
(Auckland Regional Council 2003 5).       
The next milestone was the introduction of the Affordable Housing Enabling 
Territorial Authorities Act 2008 (“the Affordable Housing Act”). This was the 
first piece of legislation that introduced the concept of inclusionary zoning for 
affordable housing. This is also the only legislation that provides powers to 
territorial authorities to adopt inclusionary zoning programmes. Section 5 of this 
Act states that:  
“The purposes of this Act are to - 
(a) enable a territorial authority, in consultation with its community, to 
require persons doing developments to facilitate the provision of 
affordable housing— 
(i) for the purpose of meeting a need for it that the authority has 
identified by doing a housing needs assessment: 
(ii) in a manner that takes account of the desirability of the 
community having a variety of housing sizes, tenures, and costs”            
This Act provided the territorial authority with discretion to provide affordable 
housing through various incentives to the developer. These incentives include, but 
are not limited to, density bonuses, waivers of impact fees, and tax abatement 
(Mallach 2010). While this Act certainly would have provided a solution to the 
current state of Auckland’s housing crisis, most of this Act was repealed in 
August 2010 by the National led government elected in late 2008. The 
Explanatory Note to the Infrastructure Bill (63-1) outlines the reasons for 
repealing the Affordable Housing Act. It states that the Act was counter-
productive and resulted in a decrease in supply of affordable housing. The 
National led government’s counter/replacement initiative was to reduce regulatory 
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barriers and compliance costs. It was concluded that the processes under the 
Affordable Housing Act were contradicting the government’s initiative by 
creating more regulatory barriers . 
2.11 HOPE Strategy  
The Labour led government facilitated the New Zealand Housing Strategy in May 
2005. This strategy identified ‘inclusionary zoning’ as one of the mechanisms to 
provide sustainable housing supply in New Zealand. The strategy reads; 
Trial the use of planning and zoning instruments, such as inclusionary 
zoning and developer incentives, to increase the supply of affordable 
housing in high pressure areas.   
              (Housing New Zealand Corporation 2005 20) 
Queenstown Lakes District Council (QLDC) entered into an agreement with the 
developer of the Jacks Point Area to set aside land for affordable housing 
(Housing New Zealand Corporation 2004 25). This later led to the adoption of the 
inclusionary policy in the HOPE (Housing Our People in our Environment) 
Strategy. The main idea of this strategy is to “use planning mechanisms to 
facilitate the provision of high quality affordable housing by the market place.” 
(Queenstown Lakes District Council 2005 14).  
Queenstown Lakes District Council had to undertake a plan change, Plan Change 
24 (PC 24), to incorporate the HOPE strategy into their district plan. This has 
undergone a laborious process, becoming operative on 27 August 2013. Providing 
affordable and community housing were seen as an important aspect of this plan 
change, while not compromising the outstanding landscape character of the 
district. Queenstown Lakes District Council (QLDC) prepared comprehensive 
assessment criteria required as part of a resource consent application for 
subdivision that involved affordable housing. Following appeals, the Environment 
Court undertook a significant change by deleting this whole section and replacing 
it with very broad assessment criteria under the objectives and policies section for 
each zone.  




1. When a land is re-zoned from rural to residential as part of Structure Plan 
processes. 
2. When up-zoning of existing urban land is proposed. 
3. When seeking to exceed normal density, floor space or unit standards that 
are considered as discretionary or non-complying under the District Plan. 
(Austin et al. 2007 39) 
Clarke (2007) identified two types of methodologies to deal with affordable 
housing; inclusionary zoning and linkage zoning. As stated in the previous 
sections of this research, inclusionary zoning requires a minimum percentage of 
residential development be provided at below-market rates to serve lower income 
households as part of new residential developments.  
Linkage zoning deals in a similar way as inclusionary zoning but requires that a 
development provide housing for a specified percentage of new employees 
generated by the development (Clarke 2007). Unlike inclusionary zoning where 
new affordable units are created through residential development, linkage zoning 
creates a demand for affordable units through non-residential development.  
Linkage zoning, as developed in North America, has had to meet legal 
tests related to establishing a rationale nexus between the impacts caused 
by the development and the nature of the mitigation required and that 
there must be a rough proportionality between the impacts generated and 
the extent of mitigation required. 
(Austin et al. 2007 44) 
Linkage zoning demonstrates a direct link between the development pressures 
faced by the region and the demand for affordable units while providing efficient 
mitigation methods where the costs of mitigation must not exceed the benefits 
(Austin et al. 2007 44). 
The basic principles involved in linkage zoning approach are: 
1. Full time equivalent jobs are calculated that are directly generated by the 
development. 
2. Understanding the income profile of the jobs created, especially low to 
moderate income jobs. 
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3. Number of households required will be derived from the number of 
workers generated by the development. 
(Austin et al. 2007 45) 
Considering the specific characteristics of Queenstown, QLDC has adopted a 
linkage zoning to deal with affordable housing in the district. This was because 
the provisions of linkage zoning matched the focus of the HOPE strategy and 
would cover both the residential and non-residential sectors. Linkage zoning was 
also adopted as it is more consistent with the effects based framework of the RMA 
(Austin et al. 2007 44). 
2.12 Housing Accord and Special Housing Areas Act (HASHAA)        
One of the steps taken by the New Zealand Central Government to address the 
housing affordability issue was the introduction of the Housing Accord and 
Special Housing Areas Act, abbreviated as HASHAA. This Act took effect on 16 
September 2013 (Housing Accord and Special Housing Areas Act 2013). The 
main purpose of this Act is: 
…..to enhance housing affordability by facilitating an increase in land and 
housing supply in certain regions or districts identified as having housing 
supply and affordability issues. 
 (Housing Accord and Special Housing Areas Act 2013) 
The main intention of this Act is for the territorial authorities to identify the status 
of housing in their respective districts. If it is identified that a housing crisis exists, 
the government works closely with the territorial authority or the local council to 
address the housing concerns by signing the Housing Accord for that district. 
Auckland was the first region to sign the Housing Accord. In December 2013, 
Christchurch City, Wellington City, Hutt City, Upper Hutt City, Porirua, Kapiti, 
Tauranga and Western Bay of Plenty were added to this legislation. This Accord 
provides an opportunity for the local council to recommend specific areas in the 
district that can promote affordable housing, known as Special Housing Areas 
(SHA). Through this Accord, local councils have permissive powers to process 
resource consent applications under SHAs which is one of the key tools to address 
immediate housing affordability and supply issues (Office of the Minister of 
Housing 2013).  
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There are certain criteria to be met to be eligible for a qualifying development4. 
The development must be; 
(i) Predominantly residential 
(ii) Low-rise (up to 5 storeys) and 
(iii)With capacity for more than 30 dwellings to be built.         
(Office of the Minister of Housing) 
The number of dwellings to be built beyond 30 as stated in criterion (iii) above 
can be subject to local council’s discretion. 
As mentioned above, Auckland was the first region to sign the housing accord in 
October 2013. “The Accord is a three year agreement to urgently increase the 
supply and affordability of housing in Auckland until Auckland Council’s Unitary 
Plan becomes fully operative in September 2016, and the Government’s Resource 
Management Act reforms for planning processes take effect” (Ministry of 
Business Innovation and Employment 2016). Auckland Council identified a 
certain target number of dwellings that need to be built every year for three years 
to address the issue of housing affordability in Auckland. Since the inception of 
the housing accord, Auckland Council identified 154 SHAs divided into 10 
tranches. All applications under these qualifying developments are assessed 
against the objectives, policies and rules of the PAUP. Auckland Council setup a 
‘one-stop shop’ known as the Housing Project Office (HPO) that offered a fast 
tracking consenting process to enable a more integrated planning and consenting 
process with a strong focus on quality development.    
2.13 Concept of Land Value Capture 
The concept of affordable housing is to sell houses or units at below-market price 
to buyers through inclusionary zoning, resulting in greater number of affordable 
units. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Dietderich (1996) is concerned that the 
developers will try to pass on losses incurred through providing inclusionary 
affordable units to buyers of non-inclusionary units. Economists argue that these 
costs must not be passed on to the buyers of non-inclusionary units but rather to 
the owner of the property who sold the land to the developer (Calavita and 
                                                 
4 Resource consent applications for a development, which are considered in Special Housing 
Areas, are qualifying developments. 
24 
 
Mallach 2009). This issue of who pays for the costs associated with the provision 
of below market houses/units – known as “incidence controversy”, remains 
unresolved (Calavita and Mallach 2010 10).  
It may often be the case that there will be an increase in land value to the 
properties that are located in the vicinity of an area that is proposed for 
development by government – this is value creation. This increase in land value 
also applies to any property that has remained untouched for several years. This 
creates an opportunity for the landowners of the untouched lands to change the 
land use of that land, for example from industrial to mixed zoning, or from 
commercial to residential – this is rezoning/upzoning. This generates profit to the 
land owners due to government actions (Calavita 2012). This raises an interesting 
debate regarding who should benefit from the increase in land value. The 
landowner believes this increase in land value is theirs because they own the 
property and they have the right to enjoy any development profits gained from it. 
From a land owner’s or developer’s perspective, they argue that they earned this 
increase in land value, as they have paid for most of the costs associated with the 
rezoning. Governments perceive that rezoning adds to development capacity and 
leads to installation of new infrastructure services. Since this will be for the 
community’s benefit, governments believe that an increase in land value must 
belong to them (Coriolis Consulting Group 2014). Ideally, the increased land 
value must be allocated to all three parties being the land owner, the government 
and the community. This approach of capturing the increase in land value is called 
Land Value Capture (LVC). 
2.14  Applications of Land Value Capture 
Most of the European countries, where this concept was implemented, captured 
land value that resulted from government actions in some form or another 
(Calavita and Mallach 2010 361). Calavita and Mallach (2010) investigated if 
inclusionary zoning can be an instrument to capture increase in land values and if 
so, under what circumstances this could be possible. In order to find answers to 
these questions, they have classified capture models into four categories based on 




Explicit and Extensive Recapture: England and Spain   
England and Spain have different kinds of capture mechanisms. The Town and 
Country Planning Act 1947 tried to regain the betterment gain but were not 
successful. The nationalization of development rights remained even though the 
1947 Act failed to regain the betterment gain. The English planning system is a 
negotiation-based approach where the developer and local authority negotiate on 
the means of provision for public amenities that need to be created as part of 
development, including affordable housing. This is often referred to as Section 
106 agreements. This negotiation process is a success in England that is able to 
provide both affordable housing and capture land values (Calavita and Mallach 
2010 362)    
In Spain, the land value capture has been set in the constitution that requires all 
property owners to provide close to 50% of their land for public facilities, like 
school, park or library, in designated planning areas. A betterment tax is also 
collected that ranges between 5 and 15% of the profits of the property owners or 
land developers that will be used for public sector. This is usually collected in the 
form of land. The density allowed for the entire development is then concentrated 
on this land and 30% of the square footage is dedicated to inclusionary housing 
(Calavita and Mallach 2010 362).    
Explicit but Limited Recapture: Ireland 
The Irish Supreme Court required landowners to surrender a part of their land 
value increase derived from its upzoning and planning permissions, but this was 
unsuccessful as Ireland lacked a sufficiently sophisticated planning system to 
implement this and its tradition of protecting property rights was also an issue. 
This was a similar case with the Town and Regional Planning Act 19345, which 
required three-fourths of the increase in land value to be paid as betterment. Part 
V of the Planning and Development Act 2000, made little consideration to the 
recapture of land value increases which resulted in weaker laws when compared 
to the legislative measures undertaken in England or Spain (Calavita and Mallach 
2010 363).    
                                                 
5 The Irish Government commenced the formal physical planning of Ireland with the enactment of 
the 1934 Town and Regional Planning Act.   
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Implicit and Ambiguous Recapture: France and Canada 
France adopted PLD (plafond légal de densité; maximum legal density) in 1975 
for recapturing land value. PLD requires a maximum density of one square meter 
of development for each square meter of land on properties located in urban areas, 
but Paris was set at 1.5 PLD (Calavita and Mallach 2010 364). Development 
rights from local authorities were sold to the developers to build higher densities. 
This density increased up to 2.0 (3.0 for Paris) for cities with population greater 
than 50,000 after 1983. In 1986, PLD was made optional and in 2000 it was 
totally abolished. The reason for abolishing PLD was it was seen as a disincentive 
to urban redevelopment and was also contributing to urban sprawl. This led to 
reduction of investment in the core central business districts (Calavita and 
Mallach 2010 364) . Today, the French planning system offers no explicit 
mechanism to capture increase in land values (Calavita and Mallach 2010 364).  
Many Canadian provinces experimented with explicit land value recapture 
schemes but were not successful. It was in Vancouver and Montreal that some of 
the recapture schemes were able to adopt inclusionary housing mechanisms 
(Calavita and Mallach 2010).  
No Value Recapture: United States  
Land Value Recapture is not extensively considered in the American planning 
system and land development. The need to provide affordable housing is legalized 
by incentives or cost offsets that will be given to the developer for providing 
Inclusionary Housing (Calavita and Mallach 2009 18). Inclusionary Housing in 
the United States is understood to be a land use regulation rather than an illegal 
exaction (Calavita and Mallach 2010 365). These cost offsets or incentives 
include density bonuses, waivers of impact fees, fast track consenting processes, 
and lower parking requirements (Calavita and Mallach 2009). While these are all 
regulatory aspects, there is very little or no benefit to the public in relation to the 
increase in land value. This approach will mostly favor the developer even though 
they make provision for affordable housing.  
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2.15 Land Value Capture in Vancouver – Community Amenity 
Contributions  
In Vancouver, capturing the increase in land value takes the form of Community 
Amenity Contributions (CAC). 
CACs are negotiated contributions from developers who recognize that 
when a property is rezoned to a higher density, the increased population 
can create the need for more community amenities and services. 
             (City of Vancouver 2011) 
The City of Vancouver is similar to Auckland, where there is a substantial amount 
of new residential and commercial development taking place throughout the year. 
The City of Vancouver acknowledges that with any new development there will 
be an increase in load on the existing social and service infrastructure. In order to 
lessen the impact on the community, CAC policy was introduced to pay for the 
costs of growth. CACs are usually in-cash contributions made by the developer 
through a negotiated process (City of Vancouver 2016a). Apart from the cost 
offsets and incentives, the negotiation-based process also considers the economic 
viability of the project. These negotiations must happen between both the 
developer and the municipality/council considering the analysis on economic 
implications for developers, landowners and the public (Calavita and Mallach 
2010). The City of Vancouver has adopted this approach (Coriolis Consulting 
Group 2014). CAC policies are only provided through rezoning of private land 
that help to build and expand facilities like park space, libraries, childcare 
facilities, community centers, transportation services, cultural facilities and 
neighborhood houses. Apart from CACs, the property developer is entitled to pay 
Development Cost Levies (DCL) based on square footage.    
 
Fig. 3: Comparison of DCLs and CACs in Vancouver 
Source: City of Vancouver (2016b) 
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2.16 Social Inclusion – International perspectives 
The growth of inclusionary zoning in Europe has seen a public policy shift from 
traditional council controlled service delivery and infrastructure provisions to 
more privatized models. Whilst this was seen as a positive shift, there has been a 
growing concern with social exclusion (Calavita and Mallach 2010 5). This issue 
of social exclusion was noticed in Europe later than in the United States and the 
former has undertaken measures to address it first in all levels of government in 
Western Europe (Calavita and Mallach 2010 11). These measures will be 
explained below under each country’s approach being England, Netherlands, 
Germany and Colombia. The above mentioned countries promoted social 
inclusion through a variety of strategies that involved strong direction and support 
from public sector (Mallach 2010 323). Social exclusion is linked not only to 
unemployment, poverty and lack of access to services, but also to housing, which 
in turn leads to spatial segregation (Calavita and Mallach 2010). Johnston et al. 
(2000) states that spatial segregation is a residential separation of sub-groups 
which can happen based on various factors including racial groups, ethnicity and 
income levels. Increasing immigration is also seen as one of the factors in 
influencing spatial segregation. Calavita and Mallach (2010) argue that in order to 
accommodate increasing numbers of migrants, new housing must be large scale, 
mass produced and located in high rise buildings. This type of housing is usually 
carried out on inexpensive land farther away from the city or metropolitan area, 
and in areas where public facilities are poorly managed. Similarly, Maré et al. 
(2011) states that individual households when making their location choices tend 
to consider a variety of factors; closeness to the transport corridor, people in the 
neighborhood and future resale value.  
Inclusionary zoning is seen as one of the methods that encourage social inclusion, 
mainly in the European and Colombian contexts and to some extent in the United 
States (New Jersey, for example). Each country’s approach to social inclusion is 
detailed below. 
England     
Inclusionary zoning in England is mainly driven by Section 106 (S106) 
agreements. S106 gives power to councils to require certain proportion of housing 
in a development for affordable housing provided it has identified a need for 
29 
 
social or low cost housing within the council’s jurisdictional boundaries 
(Whitehead 2007 cited in New Zealand Productivity Commission 2015b). This 
law requires developers to enter into legal agreements with the planning authority 
to make contributions to affordable housing on an on-going basis. The current 
policy on affordable housing through s106 is summarized below: 
1. Planning authorities’ policy must set clear targets in its local plan for the 
number of affordable housing required that can be sought through s106. 
2. Different targets must be set for social and intermediate housing that 
should specify the size and type of affordable housing that will be sought. 
3. The policy must identify a threshold limit on the number of dwellings that 
triggers provision of affordable housing. 
4. Affordable housing should be provided within the same site as that of 
market dwellings; however, off-site locations may be considered if it has 
been robustly justified.  
 (Monk 2010 145)  
A study by the Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research and the 
University of Sheffield found that on-site provision of affordable housing created 
mixed communities by integrating market units with affordable units. This study 
also revealed that the concept of ‘pepper potting’ – where affordable units are 
scattered all around the development – played a pivotal role in contributing to 
mixed communities (Monk 2010).  
Netherlands 
Housing policy in the Netherlands considers social and tenure mix as important 
characteristics in provision of affordable housing. Commonly large-scale 
developments contain a significant percentage of social housing, with 
combinations of different forms of tenure and accommodation. For example, a 
project of 75 units housing in Amsterdam built 14 private ownership units, 60 
units of work units, social rental housing, commercial rental housing and one 
large unit for a dozen people living communally (Mallach 2010) . 
This approach has been in place since 2008, with the enactment of a new spatial 
planning law which allows municipalities to require a percentage of land in new 
developments be set aside for social rental housing, housing for sale at below-
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market price, or both types. According to this law, the municipality can specify 
the number of affordable units required as well as their location within the 
development  (Mallach 2010 cited in Yuniati 2013). 
Germany 
A similar approach to that of the Netherlands was considered in Germany for 
social integration in large scale developments where they contain a mix of rental 
and owner-occupied units. This being the case, the German housing approach also 
has a distinctive feature where a group of individuals forms a housing association 
for the purposes of constructing a housing development that will be owned 
cooperatively by its members (Mallach 2010 328). This is known as cobuilding. 
Local governments in Germany support cobuilding as it is considered cost 
effective. These cobuilding associations partner with nonprofit housing companies 
to secure a percentage of their units as social housing (Mallach 2010 328).  
Bogota, Colombia 
A comprehensive national reform legislation for urban development known as 
Law 388 has established the provisions of inclusionary zoning in Colombia. This 
law requires 20 percent of units built in the more developed and planned sectors 
of the city to be social housing and a larger percentage built in peripheral sectors 
to be social housing (Mallach 2010 cited in Yuniati 2013). This minimum 
requirement was raised to 25 percent in 2007.  
However, the developers who have development particularly in expensive areas of 
the city have an opportunity to pay in lieu by substituting land in less expensive 
areas (Mallach 2010 cited in Yuniati 2013) . This shows a tendency towards trade-
offs between the goals of social inclusion and affordable housing production. 
Whilst Bogota, as a highly segregated city, had to sacrifice the need to provide 
social inclusion due to its housing crisis (Mallach 2010 cited in Yuniati 2013), it 
was promoting social inclusion by another means - by providing affordable 




3. Chapter 3 – Research Methodology 
3.1 Research approach 
This research applies the inductive approach which is a ‘bottom-up’ approach in 
which a researcher identifies research questions and goals based on the collected 
empirical data (Dahlberg and McCaig 2010 21). Moreover, inductive approaches 
are typically used in qualitative research (Dahlberg and McCaig 2010 21). 
Qualitative research seeks to understand the research topic from a local population 
perspective. It is effective in gathering information relating to specific cultural 
aspects such as social contexts of particular populations (Mack et al. 2005). The 
research topic of affordable housing and inclusionary zoning mainly relates to the 
social context of housing standard and quality of living. Qualitative research is 
also used to explore an issue in depth to address ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
(Dahlberg and McCaig 2010 117). The research’s main objective, to evaluate 
Auckland Council’s approach on affordable housing, generates an in-depth 
analysis of the past and present approach Auckland Council is undertaking to 
combat affordable housing. Therefore, qualitative methods are used for the data 
collection and analysis in this research. 
3.2 Qualitative Research 
3.2.1 Primary and Secondary Data 
Data collection to understand the concept of affordable housing and inclusionary 
zoning and its applicability and implementation in Auckland includes both 
primary and secondary data sources. 
Primary data is the ‘first-hand’ data that has not been analysed or processed. 
Usually, primary data comprises of interviews, surveys and observations. For the 
purpose of this research, the author used interviews and observations to collect 
primary data. Secondary data is usually the ‘second-hand’ data that has been 
processed or analysed by a party other than the researcher.  
The table below provides an overview of the data source and expected results 
against each sub-questions as stated in chapter 1.   






Research question Data source Answering the question Expected results 
Extent to which the current 
legislation supports inclusionary 
zoning 
Research reports, Journal articles, 
New Zealand Legislation, 
Newspaper articles.  
 Examine the historical literature relating 
to housing affordability in New Zealand. 
 Understand the current legislation about 
Housing Accord and Special Housing 
Area (HASHA) Act and how it 
contributes to achieve affordable 
housing through inclusionary zoning. 
This will identify the different 
changes in legislation and approaches 
undertaken by NZ government 
regarding housing affordability from 
the past. 
Economic impacts faced by 
developers by introducing 
inclusionary zoning 
Interviews with experts, Research 
reports 
 Study the analysis undertaken by New 
Zealand researchers as part of Unitary 
Plan. 
This will identify the ground issues 
developers are facing/have faced in 
Auckland by introducing 
inclusionary zoning.   
Extent to which inclusionary 
zoning results in better socio-
cultural outcome 
Journal articles, Research reports, 
Interviews with experts  
 Examine the current trend in land 
development/subdivisions in Auckland 
in terms of spatial segregation. 
 Also seek developers view during 
interview process. 
This approach investigates if there is 
any spatial segregation issue that 
results from the introduction of 
inclusionary zoning in developments. 




3.2.2 Stakeholder Interviews 
There are a number of methods that are encompassed in qualitative research; one 
of popular ones is semi-structured interviews. These interviews usually contain a 
list of questions set by the researcher. All participants get asked the same 
questions. The order of these questions can vary depending on how the interview 
progresses. There is flexibility in this approach and the researcher can change the 
wording of the questions according to the interview situation (Dahlberg and 
McCaig 2010 119).  
For this research, four stakeholders were selected to present their opinions and 
views on affordable housing and inclusionary zoning that were adopted in two 
major cities of New Zealand, Auckland and Queenstown. The stakeholders were 
selected based on purposive sampling technique. Participants in this approach are 
selected using specific criteria where they relate to behaviors, roles or 
characteristics. The two aims of this approach is “to ensure participants are 
relevant to the research subject and to ensure some diversity is included” (Davies 
2010).  
Participants used in this research are two senior officials from Auckland Council 
and QLDC and two land developers based in Auckland and Queenstown. I refer to 
these people as ‘stakeholders’ in this research. All the stakeholders have a direct 
connection with the provision of affordable housing either in administering it or 
delivering it on ground. Hence the author considers that the selected stakeholders 
are relevant to the research subject. The stakeholders are selected such that two of 
them work for public organization (Council) and two of them are private land 
developers to ensure some diversity is included.  
Selection of stakeholders 
The Auckland Council stakeholder was selected by sending an email to the 
general enquiries inbox of special housing area, which is available on Auckland 
Council’s website. Following on from that the Auckland Council stakeholder 




The QLDC stakeholder was selected by sending an email to one of the senior 
planners, whose contact details are available on QLDC’s website. This email was 
forwarded onto the QLDC stakeholder selected as part of this research.  
Weymouth SHA in south Auckland was the first development to utilize the 
inclusionary zoning provisions under the PAUP. The author considered that this 
case study would help in assessing the implementation of inclusionary zoning 
provisions by providing ground reality information. One of the other reasons for 
choosing Weymouth SHA as a case study in Auckland is becasue this 
development created many affordable units when compared against other 
developments that proceeded under the provisions of PAUP and HASHA Act.  
Hence, the author considered it appropriate to interview the land developer for this 
development. An email was sent to an official at NZ Housing Foundation (one of 
the land developers for Weymouth SHA) which was further forwarded onto the 
stakeholder selected as part of this research. This stakeholder showed interest in 
participating in this research. 
The author met Scott Figenshow, Director, Community Housing Aotearoa, at a 
New Zealand Planning Institute workshop held at Massey University in 
Palmerston North in April 2016. Following a presentation from Mr. Figenshow at 
the workshop, an email was sent seeking his help in suggesting a land developer 
in Queenstown who would be able to assist in this research. Mr. Figenshow 
responded via email with the land developer’s details was received by the author. 
Later an email was sent to the land developer to confirm their availability.          
Interview method 
Four semi-structured interviews with each stakeholder were conducted for the 
purpose of this research. Each interview was approximately 30 minutes to 45 
minutes in length. Due to time, financial and geographical constraints for this 
research, all the interviews were carried out over phone at a mutually convenient 
time.  
Procedures in which stakeholders were involved 
All stakeholders were advised to read through the information sheet (Appendix A) 
before scheduling an interview time. All these interviews followed an interview 




to participate in the interview (Appendix B). It was also anticipated that there may 
be some discussion topics which may be related to the research but not stated in 
the interview schedule. It was stressed to the stakeholders that the interviews were 
audio recorded and they had the right to withdraw or stop the recording at any 
point during the interview. All the participants were offered a transcribed version 
of the interview but none of them opted for this. The participants also had the 
right to refuse to answer any question, or ask that a question be removed from the 
interview schedule. None of the stakeholders chose to remove any question. 
Stakeholder’s risk of identification 
Unless otherwise stated by the stakeholders, the author intends not to disclose the 
identity of each stakeholder and to instead use pseudonyms during the analysis of 
primary data. Whilst the author took measures to reduce the risk of the 
stakeholders being identified, there is always a risk factor to be considered to 
some extent during interviews. This is acknowledged and the stakeholders were 
informed in the information sheet that was provided to them. The author advised 
the stakeholders in the information sheet that even though pseudonyms were used, 
there is a possibility that they may be identified through their role at the Council 
for Council officers, or through the housing development project the land 
developer is involved in. To protect the identities of land developers, the author 
recruited them independently from Council officials. 
3.2.3 Ethical considerations 
The concept of affordable housing is partly socially sensitive given that it talks 
about income thresholds of people. It is important that this research does not cause 
any unhappiness to any person. Hence, this research is bound by ethical 
considerations. “The most common ethical dilemmas focus around participation, 
consent, confidentiality and safeguarding personal information” (Sarantakos, 2005 
cited in Cullen 2005). In order to progress this research, it was considered 
necessary to obtain an approval from the FASS Human Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Waikato. An application was made to the Ethics 
Committee and approval was obtained to undertake research involving 
stakeholders. All stakeholders were provided with a copy of the information sheet, 




for my record). Signed consent forms from all the stakeholders were obtained 
before the start of the interview. The author also outlined the confidentiality steps 
that have been abided by and the use of pseudonyms in the analysis. The author 
also briefed the participants regarding the purpose of the research and the 
University ethical procedures binding it. Contact details of the author and author’s 
supervisor were provided, should the stakeholders wish to contact either of them 
at any time during the research.  
3.3 Case Study – Auckland 
In order to achieve the main research objective, the author considered a case study 
approach most appropriate. Auckland was selected as a case study because the 
problem of housing affordability in Auckland has been a topic of recent debate, 
making primary data to support this research easily accessible. It is necessary to 
consider how inclusionary zoning provisions introduced in the PAUP and tested 
by the HASHA Act have functioned in practice. Auckland is only the second city 
in New Zealand to include inclusionary zoning provisions in their District Plan, 
Queenstown being the first. In order to compare the approach taken by Auckland 
Council it was necessary to analyze the provisions that were adopted in 
Queenstown.  Similarly, the author selected Weymouth SHA as a sub case study 
to analyze the ground reality of inclusionary zoning provisions implemented as 
part of the Auckland Housing Accord6 process.  
3.4 Data analysis 
Interview recordings, council information, reports and other secondary data 
created a wealth of information in analyzing the data. The interpretation of 
collected data is done by coding. Coding is a form of qualitative data analysis that 
involves identifying and categorizing data based on the research questions (Smith 
and Davies 2010 152). There are three different types of coding involved; 
descriptive coding, topic coding and analytic coding (Smith and Davies 2010 
154). This research uses topic coding which aims to allow all data on a particular 
topic to be grouped together. Through the literature review it was identified that 
data analysis can be divided into three topic areas; legislative, economic and 
                                                 




socio-cultural. This process contributed to achieving the main objective of this 
research. 
3.5 Research limitations 
It must be acknowledged there are a number of limitations in undertaking this 
research and this research must be considered in view of these constraints. The 
main limitation for this research was that Auckland Council revoked the 
inclusionary zoning provisions included in the PAUP during the course of this 
research. Auckland Council notified the PAUP with inclusionary zoning policies 
in September 2013. This research started in June 2015. Following on from the 
Auckland Unitary Plan hearings, Auckland Council revoked the provisions 
relating to inclusionary zoning in August 2016. The literature review was still 
being carried out and ethics approval was obtained by this time. Hence it is to be 
noted that all the interview questions relate to the provisions being in place. The 
research question had to be amended to reflect this change.  
One other limitation for this research is the sample size of the stakeholders 
selected for interviews. Due to time constraints only four stakeholders were 
interviewed. The other limitation this research identified was very limited 
information available that shows the financial profit or loss for developers in 
developments which proceeded under the PAUP or the current Auckland Unitary 
Plan (in part). This is mainly because the Unitary Plan for Auckland is still in its 
early stages and it is too early to determine the impact of development feasibilities 
for all developments. Hence the author relied on the analysis undertaken by 
Professor Laurence Murphy and Dr Michael Rehm who were commissioned to 
review a mandatory affordable housing requirement in greenfield and brownfield 






4. Chapter 4 – Presentation of Data and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction to chapter 
This chapter considers the various reports presented as part of introducing 
inclusionary zoning provisions under the PAUP and accordingly presents the 
author’s views. This chapter also provides insight into the views expressed by 
four interviewees carried out as part of the author’s fieldwork. The four 
interviewees include; a senior official from Auckland Council, a senior official 
from Queenstown Lakes District Council, a land developer based in Auckland and 
a land developer based in Queenstown.  
This chapter will be discussed in terms of three components considered under this 
research; Legislative, Economic and Socio-Cultural.    
4.2 Legislative Dimension 
The discussion provided in the literature review relating to legislation has taken 
the whole of New Zealand into account. The discussion below provides sole 
emphasis on Auckland’s situation of the various legislative aspects which can be 
considered for the implementation of inclusionary zoning. 
4.2.1 Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities Act 2008 
As discussed earlier, this is the first piece of legislation that enabled territorial 
authorities to consider affordable housing in their decision making process. This 
Act enabled territorial authorities to assess the level of affordable housing in their 
district and determine the need for an affordable housing policy accordingly. 
During the introduction of the Bill for this Act, it was recognized that there has 
been deterioration in the rate of homeownership because of rising house prices 
(Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities Bill 2007).  
Sue Bradford, the then Member of Parliament representing the Green Party, 
during the first reading of the Bill for this Act stated that whilst there is a need for 
affordable housing in Auckland, Councils in the Auckland region may or may not 
prefer to go down this path given that implementation of this Act is completely 




After the introduction of this Act, then Waitakere City Council took the initiative 
to create affordable homes in Auckland. A development agreement was entered 
between Waitakere City Council and Housing New Zealand to redevelop the 
Hobsonville Airbase (Royal Commission on Auckland Governance 2009 252). 
This development has been undertaken and managed by Homes. Land. 
Community (HLC) (previously known as Hobsonville Land Company, a whole 
subsidiary of Housing New Zealand). Upon completion, the development will 
house approximately 10,000 people in 3000 homes of which 20% will be sold at 
an affordable price (Community Housing Aotearoa 2015). 
 
Fig. 4: Masterplan of the Hobsonville Point development 
Source: Community Housing Aotearoa (2015)  
The Royal Commission on Auckland Governance (2009) in their report states 
that, apart from the Waitakere City Council, other local councils within Auckland 
region initiated affordable housing but I found little information to support this 
statement.  
There were alternative options considered during the introduction of the Bill for 
this Act. One of them was to amend the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) 
to accommodate affordable housing (Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial 
Authorities Bill 2007). This was not considered a viable option as it would 




for territorial authorities (Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities 
Bill 2007).   
Following on from the repeal of this Act, there was case law established, as 
discussed below, that the concept of affordable housing fits within the purpose of 
the Resource Management Act. 
4.2.2 Resource Management Act 1991 
Adverse effects arising out of any activity on the environment are administered by 
New Zealand’s primary piece of environmental legislation, the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (“the RMA”). The purpose of this Act is  
to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. 
sustainable management means managing the use, development, and 
protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which 
enables people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and 
cultural well-being and for their health and safety while— 
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; 
and 
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
(c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on 
the environment. 
(s5, Resource Management Act 1991)    
Whilst there is no direct reference to housing affordability in the purpose of the 
Act, case law has established that affordable housing falls within the scope of the 
RMA. This case law relates to Queenstown Lakes District Council’s Plan Change 
247(PC24) that was publicly notified on 25 October 2007. Appeals were lodged 
against PC24 with the Environment Court and the High Court. One of the issues 
                                                 
7 Plan Change 24 is a mechanism Queenstown Lakes District Council has chosen to introduce 
affordable housing into the policies of the District Plan so that it can become a relevant matter 
when plan changes are proposed as well as when resource consent applications are considered. 
(Infinity Investment Group Holdings Limited v Queenstown Lakes District Council NZEnvC 234 




in contention was whether the proposed plan change was within the scope of the 
RMA. Both the Courts upheld that   
….at a broad level PC24 promotes the sustainable management of land 
and housing, enabling people to provide for their wellbeing while also 
remedying or mitigating the effects of constrained land use…. the statutory 
concept of sustainable management expressly recognises that the 
development of physical resources, such as land, might have an effect on 
the ability of people to provide for their social or economic wellbeing. The 
concept of social or economic wellbeing is obviously wide enough to 
include affordable and/or community housing. 
(Infinity Investment Group Holdings Limited And Ors V Queenstown Lakes 
District Council 14 February 2011) 
The Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan has seen the introduction of inclusionary 
zoning provisions that were similar to the provisions introduced in Queenstown 
Lakes District Council’s PC24. Recommendations were delivered by the 
Auckland Unitary Plan Hearings Panel (“the panel”) in July 2016. In providing 
recommendations on affordable housing the panel considered the issue of whether 
the Unitary Plan should regulate retained affordable housing. The panel was of the 
view that the affordable housing provisions that were notified were not resource 
management matters and accordingly deleted the provisions (Auckland Unitary 
Plan Independent Hearings Panel 2016a 12). But it must be noted that, as stated 
above, both the Environment Court and the High Court upheld that affordable 
housing falls within the scope of RMA and hence can be considered as resource 
management matters.  
Whilst the panel noted that the Unitary Plan enabled affordable housing, it also 
considered that the retained affordable housing provisions did not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Unitary Plan. Auckland Council in their addendum to the draft 
Unitary Plan suggested the affordable housing provisions be voluntary in areas of 
redevelopment where higher density development, like mixed use, terrace housing 
and apartment blocks are proposed. Auckland Council argued that since there will 
be greater potential for development on these sites the land value of those sites 




The panel also stated that it is not possible to distinguish plan effects on price (e.g. 
density rules) from non-plan effects (e.g. market effects, economy etc). Therefore, 
a price control through land use regulations would not be within the intent of the 
RMA (Auckland Unitary Plan Independent Hearings Panel 2016b 59). Following 
are the comments made by the Auckland Council official during the interview 
Some of the land values, particularly in greenfield areas where 
landowners thought they will have to wait for 5 or 6 years to be rezoned 
and get some infrastructure out to them, once the infrastructure was fast 
tracked and the rezoning was fast tracked their property prices went up 
quiet substantially.       
It can be inferred from the above that rezoning (particularly up-zoning) and 
provision of infrastructure to greenfield areas will certainly increase the value of 
land. 
Secondly, the panel was of the view that affordable housing provisions are 
effectively a ‘tax’ on the supply of dwellings. Therefore this may reduce the 
supply resulting in inefficient/opposite outcome than intended that will have a 
redistribution effect on another part of the market. The panel stated that this 
redistribution or taxation should not occur through land use controls under the 
RMA (Auckland Unitary Plan Independent Hearings Panel 2016b 59). The High 
Court in the PC24 case stated, with regards to tax relating to affordable housing 
provisions, that 
If PC24 is to be properly regarded as giving rise to a “power to levy” then 
it is my view that the express language that Parliament has used in the 
RMA shows that the statute must have intended an instrument like PC24 to 
have been within its scope (subject to scrutiny on the merits). In other 
words, it is included by necessary implication. Any other interpretation 
would undermine the full range of powers that Parliament intended to 
confer on territorial authorities in relation to district plans.      
(Infinity Investment Group Holdings Limited And Ors V Queenstown Lakes 
District Council 14 February 2011) 
This indicates that should affordable housing provisions be treated as a tax then 




In September 2015, the Government commissioned an enquiry to investigate the 
processes that the fast-growing councils use to provide land for housing. This 
enquiry was carried out by the New Zealand Productivity Commission (“the 
Productivity Commission”). One of the matters that the Productivity Commission 
investigated was the feasibility of inclusionary zoning provisions in District Plans. 
The PAUP was notified with the inclusionary zoning provisions when this enquiry 
was carried out. The Productivity Commission considered three international case 
studies; England, US and South Australia, to assess the impact of inclusionary 
zoning provisions on the supply of affordable housing units. The Productivity 
Commission noted that  
“….international evidence on the experience of such policies (inclusionary 
zoning policies) suggests that they have little impact on the overall supply 
of lower-priced housing. They can also have a number of other, 
undesirable effects, including uncertainty and delays, higher prices for 
non-targeted dwellings and significant administrative costs.”       
(New Zealand Productivity Commission 2015b 167) 
The Productivity Commission considered the Californian experience and noted 
that inclusionary housing policies contributed only a small portion of the 
affordable housing requirement. Whilst this is the case, Katz et al. (2003) argued 
that inclusionary zoning policies and other regulatory reforms have increased the 
number of affordable units especially where supply of affordable housing is 
almost non-existent. ‘Developer set-asides’, one of the most frequently used 
inclusionary housing tools, has proven to produce abundant affordable units in 
Montgomery County, Washington, D.C., integrated throughout more affluent 
communities. This set-aside program is not mandatory for the developer to 
implement. The benefit of implementing this programme is that the developer gets 
incentives such as density bonuses to built more units than the permitted limit 
under the underlying zoning (Katz et al. 2003 70).  
“Montgomery County, MD, an affluent suburb in the Washington, D.C. 
metropolitan area, has for decades required that all new housing 
developments larger than 50 units include 12.5 percent to 15 percent of 
units to be affordable for households at or below the county’s median 




10,600 affordable housing units, integrated throughout more affluent 
communities.” 
(Katz et al. 2003 70)        
In addition to above tool, some communities implemented other tools such as 
“development allocation plans” wherein developments are granted permits based 
on inclusion of affordable units in that development. This is based on a point 
system (Katz et al. 2003 70).   
Considering the case of UK, provision of affordable housing through S106 
agreements was considered a success. 
Government data for 2006-2007 show that, of the almost 40,000 
affordable homes completed, 27,838 were delivered through the planning 
system. In total, affordable housing provision has risen by about 25 
percent 2002-2003, and as a proportion of this total, S106 completions 
rose from approximately 40 percent in 2002-2003 to more than 66 percent 
in 2006-2007. 
…. Figures for 2007-2008 show a total of 48,028 additional affordable 
units, of which 27,110 were delivered through the planning system.   
(Monk 2010) 
Whilst the total number of affordable units achieved through the planning system 
in the UK decreased in 2007-2008 when compared to 2006-2007, this is still a 
significant number and has contributed to addressing the problem of insufficient 
affordable housing. It must be noted that there was a global financial crisis in 
2007-2008 which impacted the housing market significantly. 
The success of inclusionary zoning depends on incentives offered to the developer 
in exchange for provision of affordable housing in a development. These 
incentives can include density bonuses, a mix of allotment sizes and different 
housing typologies to suit various sectors of the community, as is evident from the 
above mentioned examples. The PAUP specifically did not have any incentives 
for the developers in exchange for inclusionary zoning provisions for affordable 




The whole Special Housing Area (SHA)8 opportunity for the developers is 
a whole incentive package. It provides usually greater density 
opportunities because it brings the Proposed Unitary Plan forward in time 
and also offers a quicker consenting process.  
On a similar note, the developer of Weymouth SHA9, when asked about 
incentives received from Auckland Council, mentioned that; 
We are an organization that provides retained affordable housing and also 
we are land developer. We understand the development process, rezoning 
land and regulatory issues. We got no cost offsets at all, no different to 
process outside of SHA development. The only benefit we got was the 
faster processing, Council created Housing Project Office (HPO) and that 
brought together different disciplines into planning team. You could go 
into HPO and talk to everyone at the same time. This was highly 
beneficial. That was the uncosted benefit which resulted in faster 
processing. 
Whilst there were incentives provided to developers in the form of a quicker 
consenting process, these benefits were only in place until the Auckland Housing 
Accord was effective or until the PAUP became operative, whichever occurred 
first. There were no on-going incentives provided as part of the (Proposed) 
Unitary Plan.  
4.2.3 Interviewees views on RMA and inclusionary zoning/affordable 
housing 
As stated earlier, the RMA is the main piece of legislation for managing the 
environment in New Zealand. Its purpose is to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources. Inclusionary zoning provisions 
proposed in the PAUP and PC24 in the QLDC District Plan were set out under the 
RMA framework. During the interview process each of the interviewee’s opinions 
were gathered. The interviewees were either decision makers under the RMA or 
developers who used the inclusionary zoning provisions in their development. 
                                                 
8 Special Housing Areas were developed under the Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas 
Act 2013. This will be discussed further in the other part of this chapter. 
9 Weymouth SHA was the first SHA approved by Auckland Council after the inception of 





Questioning focused on the extent to which the RMA supports inclusionary 
zoning.  
That’s an issue people like to debate as to whether inclusionary zoning is 
appropriately handled under the RMA. Some people argue no, and that’s 
what the Independent Hearings Panel argued in the Plan and Auckland 
Council argued that it is the appropriate location and refer to multitude of 
jurisdictions internationally that include inclusionary zoning and planning 
rules. I think it is a matter of opinion and certainly the RMA, to my 
knowledge, doesn’t specifically talk about inclusionary zoning so in that 
sense it is not that helpful to inclusionary zoning.  
(Auckland Council official) 
Not very well. The court case has established it (inclusionary zoning) can 
be done under the RMA. It would be better if we can just accept that rather 
than trying and making effects based argument. The evidence of the 
developers is that the development doesn’t cause affordability in fact it 
(inclusionary zoning) helps to resolve it (affordability). 
(QLDC official) 
It can be gathered from the above comments that the RMA does not explicitly 
mention affordable housing or any tools associated with it to be considered in 
District Plans. However, rulings from the Environment Court and the High Court 
determine that affordable housing is a socio-economic effect on the environment 
which fits within the purpose of the RMA.  
The Auckland Council official referred to the evidence produced by David Mead 
on behalf of Auckland Council. The evidence relates to the affordable housing 
provisions as stated under Chapters C7.6 and H6.6 of the PAUP. David Mead 
states in his evidence that; 
Section 7 (of the RMA) matters tend to meld the urban form to better fit 
local characteristics and features, which further affects choices and 
opportunities. Whether it be standards relating to density, or height, or 
design-based assessments, there is an impact on housing opportunities, 
and ultimately prices         




I agree with Mr. Mead’s above statement, as one of the matters decision makers 
must have regard to is the maintenance and enhancement of amenity values as 
stated in section 7 of the RMA. These amenity values are confined to a local area 
and the choice of housing may be restricted if that area is sensitive to intensified 
development. Mr. Mead also stated that an explicit affordable housing policy is 
required given the fast pace at which Auckland is growing into a much larger, 
dense and complex environment by not comprising high quality living 
environments.  
4.2.4 RMA amendments  
The Productivity Commission’s report on ‘Using Land for Housing’ identified 
there is no adequate recognition of the needs of cities for housing under the RMA. 
The report also noted from the various submissions received as part of the inquiry 
that suggested more fundamental legislative changes are required to better address 
the issue of housing in cities (New Zealand Productivity Commission 2015b). The 
Productivity Commission’s report identified two aspects to accommodate growth 
in the cities and encourage affordable housing being; the ease with which 
developers can rezone the land for higher density purposes and the speed at which 
they can gain approvals (Resource Consents and Building Consents) to construct 
dwellings. The research showed that the high growth Councils, such as Auckland 
Council, Hamilton City Council and Christchurch City Council, take longer to 
make plan changes operative when compared with other local authorities.  
 
Fig. 5: Time taken to complete District Plan changes and make changes operative, by type of 
council 




Whilst this situation is not unusual in an international context as cities have to 
consider the interests of more people, the size and population of those cities are 
much larger in scale when compared to the cities of New Zealand.      
The length of time to make plan changes operative depends on the number of 
submissions received and the subsequent appeals being settled. With the current 
provisions of the RMA, any person who is not directly affected by the plan 
change can still make a submission which results in further delay in the process. 
Accordingly, the Productivity Commission recommended changes to the RMA 
that would allow only the directly affected parties of proposed plan changes that 
are specific to particular sites to be notified and make a submission. This is 
similar to the provisions under the HASHA Act where applications relating to 
‘qualifying developments’ are processed on a limited notified basis.  
The delay in the process applies not only to plan changes but also to resource 
consents. At the time of writing this thesis, the RMA required any resource 
consent application, including consent applications relating to residential 
developments, to be publicly notified if  
i. The proposal will have or likely to have adverse effects on the 
environment to be more than minor; or 
ii. The applicant requests for public notification; or 
iii. A rule or any national environmental standard explicitly states public 
notification; or  
iv. Special circumstances exist in relation to the application. 
As stated earlier, public notification gives power to the parties who are not 
directly affected by the consent proposal. This will place the developer/applicant 
at risk as there is significant uncertainty as to the likely outcome of the application 
and the cost involved in the whole process. 
In order to address the above concerns, the government introduced another phase 
of reforms to the RMA, the Resource Legislation Amendment Act 2017 (“RLAA 
2017”) that was effective since 10 October 2017. This Act introduced 40 
amendments to the last version of the RMA and significant changes to other 
legislations to better align with each other. In particular, the amendments aim to 




streamlined resource consent process (Ministry for the Environment 2017a).  
Some of the amendments that relate to residential development include; 
1. New functions for Councils to ensure there is sufficient residential and 
business development capacity to meet expected demand. 
2. Two statutory processes to prepare and change policy statements or plans; 
a. Streamlined planning process – where a council can request the 
Minister for the Environment to provide greater flexibility in 
planning processes and timeframes.   
b. Collaborative planning process – an alternative planning process 
wherein the community can participate at the start of the process 
when alternatives, costs and benefits of various options are 
considered and debated for an informed decision. This process can 
reduce any litigation costs or lengthy delays later. 
3. Limited notification of plan changes to directly affected parties. 
4. Changes to resource consent notification process. 
(Ministry for the Environment 2017b) 
 
4.2.5 NPS-UDC vs Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities 
Act 2008 
In order to address the issue of housing affordability and provide adequate supply 
of housing, the government introduced the National Policy Statement on Urban 
Development Capacity (“NPS-UDC”). NPS-UDC came into effect on 1 
December 2016. Section 31 of the RLAA 2017 states that; 
31 Functions of territorial authorities under this Act 
(1) Every territorial authority shall have the following functions for the 
purpose of giving effect to this Act in its district: 
…… 
(aa) the establishment, implementation, and review of objectives, policies, 
and methods to ensure that there is sufficient development capacity in 
Recommendation - 1: 
Territorial Authorities should recognize the fact that affordable housing can be 




respect of housing and business land to meet the expected demands of the 
district. 
The above amendment is the first time, since the inception of the RMA, which 
includes explicit reference to housing in the RMA. This NPS plays a vital role in 
providing national direction to local authorities to enable urban development by 
providing sufficient development capacity for housing and businesses. This NPS 
aims to minimize artificially inflated house prices and contribute to improving 
housing affordability (Ministry for the Environment 2016).    
In order to understand if NPS-UDC can address housing affordability I have 
compared it against the provisions of the repealed Affordable Housing: Enabling 
Territorial Authorities Act 2008 (“Affordable Housing Act”). The table below 






















  Provisions Affordable Housing Act NPS-UDC Do the provisions overlap 
with each other 
Applicability  Applies to all territorial authorities (TA) All the objectives apply to all TAs whilst only 
a few policies apply to all TAs. Apart from 
those policies a different set of policies apply 
to TAs that are classified in the medium-
growth and high-growth urban areas.   
Partly 
There are a few policies under 
NPS-UDC that apply to all TAs 
like the provisions of 
Affordable Housing Act. 
Purpose Enables TAs to require developers to provide 
affordable housing  
 for the purpose of meeting a need for it 
that the authority has identified by 
doing a housing needs assessment. 
 in a manner that takes account of the 
desirability of the community having a 
variety of housing sinclusionary 
zoninges, tenures, and costs. 
Recognize the national significance of: 
 enabling urban environments to 
develop and change. 
 providing sufficient development 
capacity to meet the needs of people 
and communities and future 
generations in urban environments. 
Partly 
Whilst both the Affordable 
Housing Act and NPS-UDC are 
required to consider the needs 
of the community by providing 
various types of housing 
choices and costs, there is no 




A TA must choose a method that gives results 
for the authority’s district that include — 
 a description of the current balance 
between supply and demand in the 
Policies under NPS-UDC require TAs to 
ensure that there is sufficient housing and 
business development capacity at any one 
time. The policies also require medium and 
high growth area TAs to undertake housing 
Yes 
Both the Affordable Housing 
Act and NPS-UDC requires 
TAs to carry out development 






housing market generally and, if 
relevant, in different sectors. 
 the identification of land available for 
housing development. 
 an estimate of the number of 
households that currently need 
affordable housing and the number 
that are likely to need it in the 
reasonably foreseeable future. 
and development capacity assessment every 
three years and require it to be published to the 
public.    
capacity assessment to identify 
the demand and supply gaps for 
housing in their districts or 
regions. The only difference is 
NPS-UDC does not take into 




An authority that adopts an affordable housing 
policy must review it after identifying community 
outcomes at least once for every six years. 
In order for TAs to be well informed about the 
demand for housing and business development 
capacity, TAs must monitor a range of 
indicators on a quarterly basis. One of 
indicators includes housing affordability.  
Yes 
Overall, both the Affordable 
Housing Act and NPS-UDC 
require their provisions to be 
monitored and reviewed by the 
TAs to ensure that the housing 
affordability purpose is being 
met. The difference being NPS-
UDC requires monitoring every 
3 months while the Affordable 
Housing Act requires it for at 
least once every six years. 




Table 3 illustrates the comparison of provisions of the now repealed Affordable 
Housing Act and the NPS-UDC which is effective since 1 December 2016. Both 
these statutes were introduced by two NZ leading parties, the former one by 
Labour Party and latter by National Party. It can be concluded from the above 
analysis that whilst both the statutes may have similar implementation and 
monitoring techniques the Affordable Housing Act has a direct link to provision 
of affordable housing but the NPS-UDC only focuses on reducing the barriers to 
increasing housing supply, enabling a quicker and more fit‐for‐purpose response 
to housing demand. 
The question that needs to be answered is ‘Does the introduction of NPS-UDC 
solve affordable housing crisis?’ The short answer is no. The reason is because 
NPS-UDC mainly refers to enabling more housing developments by increasing 
the supply. This is carried out by the District Plan on a daily basis. Whilst there 
may not be specific provisions (objectives and policies) relating to supply of 
housing in all the District Plans, the provisions stated in the NPS-UDC are similar 
to the one’s stated in many of the District Plans. This appears to be a double up 
with what TA’s are already addressing through District Plans. It appears that in 
this instance, district plans are leading the NPS-UDC, rather than vice versa.  
NPS-UDC stresses providing sufficient ‘development capacity’ to meet the needs 
of people and communities and their future generations. The term development 
capacity is defined as; 
Development capacity means in relation to housing and business land, the 
capacity of land intended for urban development based on:  
a) the zoning, objectives, policies, rules and overlays that apply to the 
land, in the relevant proposed and operative regional policy statements, 
regional plans and district plans; and  
b) the provision of adequate development infrastructure to support the 
development of the land. 
(Ministry for the Environment 2016 7) 
As highlighted in bold in the definition above, NPS-UDC only identifies the extra 
potential of any housing and business land for urban development. It can be 




medium density development, but remains silent on urban redevelopment. This 
fails to recognize that urban redevelopment can play a vital role in increasing the 
housing and business capacity (Mead 2016).  
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2017) 
Figure 6 illustrates the number of building consents approved by Auckland 
Council and its predecessor councils for new dwellings within the Auckland 
region since 2010 until August 2017. There has been a gradual increase in the 
approved number of building consents. Assuming high percentage of these have 
been constructed, that number will be equally high as that of approved number of 
consents. The housing supply has been increasing since 2010 till date but the 
problem of housing affordability has been getting worse. This being the case, the 
main objective of NPS-UDC to provide ‘more supply’ of housing may not solve 
the problem of housing affordability.     
 
4.2.6 HASHA Act and Auckland Housing Accord     
As discussed in chapter 2, the New Zealand Government introduced the HASHA 
Act to improve housing affordability through increasing the supply of housing in 








2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Until Aug
2017
Fig. 6: Number of building consents approved for new dwellings in the 
Auckland region 
Recommendation - 2: 
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territorial authorities. Specific areas in selected regions were identified to fast 
track the development process and simultaneously promote affordable housing. 
These areas are Special Housing Areas (SHAs) and the developments are called 
‘Qualifying Developments (QD)’. Unsurprisingly, Auckland was chosen as one of 
the regions. Auckland Council identified 154 SHAs divided into 10 tranches. The 
provisions of PAUP applied to all the QDs. The target of the Auckland Housing 
Accord was to create 39,000 new sites and dwellings over a span of three years 
beginning in 2013 and ending in 2016.  
Three options existed for QDs that were developed in a SHA where 15 or more 
dwellings were created; 
1. Minimum of 10% of the development must be ‘relative affordable’ 
meaning the dwelling must be sold for no more than 75% of the Auckland 
region’s median house price. The median house price used to determine 
‘relative affordability’ must be based on data published by the Real Estate 
Institute of New Zealand for the most recent full month of September, in 
relation to the date the application for consent is lodged. This option 
applies to private developers. 
2. Minimum of 5% of the development must be ‘retained affordable’ where 
the dwelling must be sold where the monthly mortgage payments do not 
exceed 30 per cent of the Auckland median household income. The 
median household income must be referenced to the data published by 
Statistics New Zealand for the most recent June quarter. This option 
applies to community housing providers.  
3. The last option if achieving a combination of both relative and retained 
affordable housing in a development. A ratio of two relative to one 
retained is required when both the options are combined.  
(2016)   
Auckland Council has published an update on relative affordable and retained 
affordable dwellings consented under the Auckland Housing Accord and Special 





Fig. 7: Sites or dwellings approved through the qualifying development process 
Source: Author’s analysis of Auckland Council’s update report 
The above figure illustrates the relative and retained affordable houses approved 
as part of QDs. A total of 16,132 sites/dwellings have been approved till date out 
of which only 8% have been relative affordable where the dwellings were sold to 
first home buyers and 13% have been retained affordable which are under the 
control of community housing providers (Dunshea 2017). While it is good that 
there are a few affordable houses being constructed, this amount is not sufficient 
to meet the affordable housing needs of the current market trend in Auckland.  
 
Fig. 8: Sites or dwellings currently being processed through the qualifying development process 
Source: Author’s analysis of Auckland Council’s update report 
The above figure illustrates the relative and retained affordable houses that are 
still being processed as part of QDs. A total of 3116 sites/dwellings are being 
processed of which only 3% are relative affordable and 11% are retained 






















Both the above figures indicate that a very small percentage of relative affordable 
units have been created as part of the Auckland Housing Accord process. Whilst 
the retained affordable units are proportionally higher than the relative affordable 
units, the competition to secure the former units is very high as the purchasers’ 
criteria are more permissive than the latter.  
The introduction of HASHA Act has seen some positive outcomes from both the 
council and developers’ perspective. Whilst there were no major numbers of 
affordable units created, the council has seen a large influx of consent applications 
for QDs that in turn resulted in meeting the council’s required target of 39,000 
dwellings and sites in three years. A total of 46,793 dwellings and sites were 
consented as part of the Auckland Housing Accord (Dunshea 2017). On the other 
hand, developers were offered quicker consenting process than the standard RMA 
timeframe under an integrated team of council officers. They also had the 
opportunity to provide greater densities than would be allowed under the 
Operative District Plan of that time, as it gave legal weight to the provisions of 
PAUP which allowed a greater level a housing density sooner than what would 
occur under standard RMA processes. During the interview process, the developer 
of Weymouth SHA stated that 
“The benefit we got was the faster processing, Council created Housing 
Project Office (HPO) and that brought together different disciplines into 
planning team. You could go into HPO and talk to everyone at the same 
time. This was highly beneficial. That was the uncosted benefit which 
resulted in faster processing.” 
After the revoking of Auckland Housing Accord, Auckland Council has 
disestablished HPO and replaced it with Development Programme Office (DPO). 
The role of DPO is similar to HPO but the former does not process resource and 
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4.2.7 Role of Stakeholder Deeds 
QLDC recognized that housing affordability is a key issue that needs to be 
addressed in the District. As stated in chapter 2 under section 2.11, QLDC has 
identified a mechanism to secure affordable housing as part of any plan change 
process by entering into a private agreement with the land developer. These 
private agreements are called ‘stakeholder deeds’. These deeds are voluntary 
agreements but will be binding upon the developer, once signed. Each stakeholder 
deed has a different set of rules depending on the size of plan change. The broad 
intent of these stakeholder deeds is set out below; 
1. The developer must set aside certain percentage of land that is part of the 
development for affordable housing, usually 5%, as part of rezoning the 
land for higher density. This contribution of land can either be for 
affordable housing or community housing10 or both (Macleod and Overton 
2009).  
2. As part of stakeholder deeds, Council can require the developer to sell 
affordable housing units in the development to a certain set of people who 
meet eligibility criteria. This criteria can relate to the residency status of 
the buyer, first home buyer, if they intend to own and occupy exclusively 
for their residence, and meeting an income threshold (2017).  
3. As part of stakeholder deeds, an agreement must be reached between the 
Council and the developer that the community housing units will be 
transferred to the Queenstown Lakes Community Housing Trust 
(“QLCHT”). These units will be managed by QLCHT.  
4. Council can also require the developer to impose a condition to restrict on- 
sale of affordable units for a market value price in the future. These units 
can be retained as affordable by placing a covenant, caveat or an 
encumbrance on the title of that unit.  
It must be noted that the above stakeholder deed requirement is similar to the 
provisions stated in the repealed Affordable Housing Act. 
                                                 
10 Community Housing means residential land and/or housing stock owned, leased or otherwise 
managed through the Queenstown Lakes Community Housing Trust to ensure the long term 




Both the QLDC’s official and the land developer in Queenstown were interviewed 
on the stakeholder deed aspect who had different views with regards to the 
functionality of it.   
The QLDC official stated that 
“The main measure was that you will get your rezoning, the council will 
view your proposal more favorably for rezoning if you make a 
contribution to the community and affordable housing. That was the main 
incentive. What the council has been doing and continues to do in the 
interim is to enter into private agreements with developers (stakeholder 
deeds). PC24 was an approach to standardize those agreements; some 
developers are more generous than others in providing more affordable 
units.” 
On the other hand the land developer from Queenstown stated that  
“It (Stakeholder deeds) is one of those things that council, in my view, 
thinks it sounds nice but don’t understand the ground reality. 
Unfortunately most developers, not all, will not voluntarily bind into this 
scheme. I think there are some refinements to be done. Previous 
stakeholder deeds, in two developments where I was involved in, don’t 
give any real benefit to the developer. The 5% land or building 
contribution at the time of rezoning does not provide any real benefit for 
providing more affordable housing. I think council could work on that as 
well. The other option is to have some bonuses through development 
contributions or the like but again, to my knowledge, up to date there is no 
bonus for developers.”        
From the above views of the QLDC official and the developer, it can be 
understood that whilst there are stakeholder deeds being initiated by the Council 
to secure affordable housing from developers, the latter are not making much 
profit through the development when entering into stakeholder deeds.  
There are also cases where the developer has misused the provisions of 
stakeholder deed to gain plan change approval for their proposal. The decision 




“……We note that we are disappointed that QREL (the applicant) has 
chosen to use this agreement (stakeholder deed) as a bargaining tool for 
development approval. 
… As this is a voluntary Stakeholders Deed and due to the conditions 
sought by QREL, this deed, as agreed to by QREL, is rendered invalid.”      
These stakeholder deeds are similar to the S106 agreements under the English 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990 wherein the developer enters into an 
agreement with the Local Planning Authority (LPA). S106 agreements come into 
play when it is considered that the proposal will have adverse effects on the 
surrounding area which cannot be mitigated by conditions of planning decision 
(Tendring District Council 2017). These agreements ensure that any additional 
development value created as part of the planning decision is captured and used 
for the benefit of local community (Burgess et al. 2013 3). Research shows that 
there were quite a lot of affordable houses created as part of S106 agreements. 
One of the reasons for its success, in my opinion, is because these agreements are 
not voluntary, unlike the stakeholder deeds as in the case of Queenstown. S106 
agreements are mandatory under the legislation to off-set any negative impacts 
generated out of the proposed development. These agreements must be signed 
before a planning decision has been made by the LPA.  





4.2.8 Case Study – Weymouth SHA 
Background 
Ngā Mana Whenua o Tāmaki Makaurau (“Tāmaki Collective”) is the Treaty 
settlement entity representing the 13 iwi and hapū of Tāmaki Makaurau 
(Auckland). In a landmark negotiation, all 13 iwi and hapū came together to 
negotiate with the Crown in relation to shared customary interests and collective 
Recommendation - 4: 
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settlement structures. The Deed of Settlement was signed between the iwi and 
hapū of the Tāmaki Collective and the Crown on 8 September 2012. 
An important goal for the Tāmaki Collective is the delivery of high quality social, 
community and affordable housing solutions given the importance of housing to 
whānau wellbeing and the significant demand for Māori housing in Tāmaki 
Makaurau. Waimahia Inlet, Weymouth has been discussed by the Crown since 
~2006 as a potential area for social/community housing development, but with no 
project eventuating. The Tāmaki Collective has been progressing discussions on 
Weymouth with the Crown owned entity Social Housing Unit (SHU) since 
November 2011 via its Treaty settlement protocols and has formed a consortium 
under the name “Tamaki Makaurau Community Housing Limited” with a range of 
partners - The New Zealand Housing Foundation; CORT Community Housing; 
and emerging Māori housing provider the Auckland and Onehunga Hostels 
Endowment Trust. 
The consortium has worked with SHU and the wider Auckland Community 
Housing Network to develop a plan for an innovative mixed use community that 
can: 
 Be a path finder for affordable housing solutions 
 Help consolidate skills and capacity in community housing and help to 
develop an effective non-government sector of social and affordable 
housing 
 Make a meaningful contribution to acute housing needs in South Auckland 
Site and Proposal 
The development site lies approximately 23km south of Auckland CBD, 8km 
south east of Auckland International Airport, and 5km south west of Manukau 
City. 
The site forms part of the suburb of Weymouth and lies on the eastern side of 
Weymouth Peninsula, which projects into the Manukau Harbour with Waimahia 





Fig. 9: Location of Waimahia Inlet Residential Development 
Source: Auckland Council GIS  
The proposal was to create 283 new dwellings and sites over four years starting 
from 2013. The development was carried out in a series of staged residential 
building and subdivision applications that will enable comprehensive 
development of the site in accordance with the Waimahia Residential Master Plan. 
 
Fig. 10: Masterplan of Waimahia Inlet Residential Development 
Source: (Jasmax Ltd 2013)  
Legal framework 
This development comprises a comprehensive proposal to develop the site for 
residential purposes and to deliver much needed, quality, affordable and culturally 
appropriate housing to the south Auckland housing market. The subject site is 
identified as a SHA in the Auckland Housing Accord.  It is therefore subject to the 




Cost offsets and Incentives 
It could be expected that the developer would receive some incentives from the 
Council as this development was carried out under the HASHA Act provisions, 
where the main intention is to provide more supply of housing and also create 
affordable units. There was no cost offsets provided to the developer as part of 
this development.  
“We got nothing. We fully understand the development process, we fully 
understand the rezoning of land, regulatory issues around rezoning of 
land and our experience pre-Weymouth in doing land development and 
subsequent doing land development, from a processing angle, we got very 
little difference. We got no cost offsets at all. The only benefit (incentive) 
we got was a faster processing through the HPO.”    
Source: Weymouth SHA land developer 
Housing Typology 
The site had been designed to provide sections typically 25m deep, thus blocks of 
50m depth where 2 sections are back to back. This provides a flexible 
development structure, with section depths that can accommodate a range of 
house sizes.  
There were 12 different houses designed which range from 2 bedroom through to 
5 bedroom homes.  
 
Fig. 11: Housing Typologies in Waimahia Inlet Residential Development  
Source: Author’s analysis from design statement  
It can be inferred from figure 11 that 70% of dwellings are being 4 or 5 bedroom 
















could have been used for housing typologies that can create more density by 
proposing terraced houses and apartments with an option of one bedroom units as 
well. 
Housing Tenure 
The housing tenure is a direct response to the local context, demand and 
demographics. 
The development provides new housing products that meet household demand 
and assists households to move out of rental housing and along the housing 
continuum, and to provide longer term tenure stability. It is specifically aimed to 
provide housing that supports the ethnic diversity, cultural wellbeing and 
communal aspirations of Weymouth’s Māori and Pacific Island communities. 
All dwellings are designed to be tenure blind, so that it is not easy to differentiate 
between homes that are private and those that are shared ownership or rented and 
support systems will be in place to assist in maintenance and management of 
properties. 
 
Fig. 12: Housing Ownership Continuum in Waimahia Inlet Residential Development  
Source: (Jasmax Ltd 2013) 
The QD criteria for this SHA do not actually require the scheme to provide any 
affordable housing. However, the proposal provided a mixed tenure community 
across the development, with the scheme providing approximately 60% of these 
dwellings as affordable homes. This percentage is then broken down between both 
social/ community rental dwellings (30%) and affordable home ownership 




typologies of dwellings across the site have also been targeted to meet the local 
housing needs specific to the South Auckland context. A total of 241 retained 
affordable houses have been constructed with a further 26 under construction 
(Dunshea 2017). 
4.3 Economic Dimension 
4.3.1 Development viability in greenfield and brownfield areas 
In order to address the development viability component of the economic 
dimension, this research relies on the analysis undertaken by Professor Laurence 
Murphy and Dr Michael Rehm who were commissioned to review a mandatory 
affordable housing requirement in greenfield and brownfield areas and a bonus-
based affordable housing provision in brownfield areas, as proposed in the 
addendum to the PAUP. The notified version, as of 30th September 2013, of the 
PAUP however did not propose separate provisions for greenfield and brownfield 
areas.  
The reason for relying on their analysis is, firstly, there is very limited information 
available that shows the financial profit or loss for developers in developments 
proceeded under the PAUP or the current Auckland Unitary Plan (in part). This is 
mainly because the Unitary Plan for Auckland is still in its early stages and it is 
too early to determine the impact of development feasibilities for all 
developments. Secondly, Dr. Murphy and Mr. Rehm, as part of their research, 
directly interviewed eleven property professionals with extensive experience. 
Thirdly, their analysis directly relates to the provisions that were part of the 
PAUP. Hence, I consider their analysis coupled with my comments can address 
the economic impact of inclusionary zoning on land developers. 
Their analysis identified hypothetical case studies that involved mandatory 
inclusionary zoning requirement in the greenfield area and a voluntary bonus 
based approach in the Brownfield area which will be discussed below. 
Greenfield area  
Dr. Murphy and Dr. Rehm acknowledge that mandatory inclusionary zoning 
requirement has the ability to alter the project’s cost and revenue value which 
eventually affects the development feasibility. In order to understand the 




Rehm looked at two hypothetical case studies – one in Papakura and other in 
Upper Harbor. Both the case studies have similar parameters but the location 
differed. Papakura is located in a submarket area where much of greenfield 
development is being undertaken. Upper Harbour is located in an up market area 
where the house prices are considerably higher.  
The analysis is carried out under the residual land valuation approach. This 
approach deals with feasibility of development based on developer’s profit margin 
that is assessed by the difference in anticipated revenue and development costs of 
the proposal (Mead 2013).    
Murphy and Rehm (2013b) assessed the development feasibility with varying 
inclusionary zoning policy requirements. In order to determine the threshold for 
the development losing its viability, Murphy and Rehm considered 20%, 25% and 
30% development margins and assessed them against each of the varying 
inclusionary zoning policy requirement in Papakura (low value area) and Upper 
Harbor (high value area).  
 
Fig. 13: Development viability as per inclusionary zoning policy requirements in greenfield areas 
Source: (Murphy and Rehm 2013b)  
Figure 13 illustrates that development in the low value area is viable if the 
inclusionary zoning requirement is capped at 15% with development margin of 
20% provided the development includes section and house package. The 




without building a house on it (even without inclusionary zoning requirement). As 
the development margin increases the development becomes less and less viable 
in the low value area. On the contrary, the development becomes viable, even 
with greater percent of inclusionary zoning (35%) for serviced sections in high 
value area at 20% development margin. The viability decreases with a decrease in 
percent of inclusionary zoning requirement for sections that have a dwelling 
(Murphy and Rehm 2013b). The reason for this could be that in the high value 
area, to maintain the high amenity of the surrounding area with up market 
dwellings the developer constructs a dwelling with high cost building materials 
which eventually decreases their development margin.     
However, Mead (2013) argues that the analysis of Murphy and Rehm is subject to 
four variables; 
1. Revenue from market rate housing - the fluctuation in market rate housing 
has not been considered. 
2. Raw block value – This depends on the overall land supply. The 
development is viable only if house prices move up along with increases in 
land value when there is limited supply of land. “A drop in land values due 
to more supply provides more scope to accommodate additional costs 
provided market rate house prices do not decline too much in response.” 
(Mead 2013). 
3. Time involved – The model did not consider the time taken to obtain 
zoning or resource consent. 
4. Developers’ profit or loss margin – Developers may expect a higher profit 
margin when they have to comply with the inclusionary zoning 
requirement as they see it as an additional risk. 
Mead (2013) states that the development viability decreases in low value areas as 
the time involved in the process increases and additional profit is expected from 
the developers due to uncertainty. This concern can be addressed by the 
provisions of the HASHA Act which provides more certainty with regards to 
timeframes of consent processing and lapse date. One of the options is to include 
these provisions in the mutual agreement between the council and developer as 




Overall, it can be gathered from the analysis, undertaken by Murphy and Rehm, 
that imposing mandatory inclusionary zoning requirements can be viable for 
development proposals in both low and high value areas.      
Brownfield area 
Murphy and Rehm (2013a) note that development feasibility in brownfield areas 
differ from that of greenfield areas in that the former will have various constraints 
that include land supply, land ownership, and physical process of site preparation. 
The researchers considered the most important constraint to be land ownership 
issues. They compared this issue with the UK situation where residential 
brownfield developers faced “problems in identifying land owners, divided 
ownership rights, land assembly issues, land owners with unreasonable price 
expectations and land owners unwilling to sell” (Adams et al, 2001 cited in 
Murphy and Rehm 2013a). In comparison with greenfield development, 
brownfields usually demand a different set of housing typologies apart from the 
stand alone houses. These can be terraced houses, apartment buildings or mixed 
use developments. This being the case, brownfield developments usually require 
different construction and design methods and marketing skills to that of 
greenfield areas.   
The addendum to the PAUP proposed a voluntary based approach for inclusionary 
housing units in brownfield areas. Given that the brownfield sites were up-zoned 
as a result of PAUP, it was recognized that the land values would have increased 
and to compensate for that increase the developers can utilize density bonuses in 
their development provided affordable houses are incorporated. Murphy and 
Rehm (2013a) compared this approach to that of US and UK’s inclusionary 
zoning policies and concluded that the approach proposed in the addendum to the 
PAUP is a hybrid approach of that of the US and UK. They also concluded that 
Auckland’s approach is more developer friendly than that of the S106 regime in 
the UK. 
Developments under the SHA had density bonuses but these only related to the 
bonuses achieved by rezoning the land to a higher density zone under the PAUP 
when compared to the zone provisions under the legacy District Plan. These 




the Unitary Plan became operative, the concept of the density bonus did not apply 
as the provisions of legacy District Plan were invalid.  
The main driver for a developer to opt for the bonus approach in the development 
is “the extra net cost of building the affordable units compared to the extra net 
revenue from sale of the additional market rate units arising from the bonus.” 
(Auckland Council 2013d). If the extra revenue from the additional market rate 
units outweighs the extra construction cost of affordable units then the 
development becomes viable and the developer may consider providing affordable 
units within the development. In order to test this, Murphy and Rehm (2013a) 
analyzed development scenarios that involved five housing typologies and 
developer margins in higher and medium value areas. As part of their analysis, the 
researchers also considered market conditions for the development scenarios. 
Figure 14 provides the analysis undertaken by the researchers.   
 
Fig. 14: Development viability as per inclusionary zoning policy requirements in brownfield areas 
Source: (Murphy and Rehm 2013a) 
Figure 14 illustrates that development viability appears more favorable in higher 




most market conditions. In high value areas all developments seem to be viable 
with a 20% development margin even in depressed market conditions, but the 
viability decreases for two high rise developments when the development margin 
is increased. It can also be noted from the above figure that for medium quality 
developments most of the developments are viable except for Metropolitan Zone 
developments that includes high rise apartments. This is because the high costs of 
construction of the bonus units either outweighs or gets close to the extra revenue 
from market-rate units.  
The researchers’ analysis also notes that whilst the development seems viable in 
high rise development scenario, the developers are concerned there could be 
marketing risks involved by comingling affordable units within high end 
apartment blocks that involve market-rate units. In order to test this perception, 
Eaqub (2017) undertook a study that analyzed the impact of affordable housing 
within 150m of market-rate units in Queenstown. The study concluded that whilst 
there is no significant impact of constructing affordable housing close to market-
rate dwellings, developers must consider the amenity values and density of the 
surrounding neighborhood (Eaqub 2017). It is expected there will be an effect on 
the amenity values on the surrounding environment with the increase in density 
but this can be mitigated by good urban design techniques where the bulkiness of 
the development can have softer visual effects.     
      
 
 
4.4 Socio-Cultural Dimension  
As discussed in chapter 2, section 2.16, inclusionary zoning is seen as one of the 
methods which encourage social inclusion. This was implemented in Auckland 
through the PAUP. The PAUP required the provision of retained affordable 
housing to ensure wider housing choices and a balanced social mix was provided 
for in new residential developments. There were provisions to ensure that the 
location of affordable units  were evenly spread throughout the development by 
providing no more than three affordable units in any one cluster and also 
providing a similar floor area to that of market-rate units.  
Recommendation - 5: 
Have different provisions of inclusionary zoning policy requirements for 




There is very limited information available on the current trends of socio-cultural 
analysis that resulted from the developments under the Proposed and Operative 
Unitary Plan. The author relies on the primary data collected through interviews 
of two people from Auckland; one is an Auckland Council representative and 
other is a land developer in Auckland. 
“I think one of the things that relative affordable mechanism drives means 
that the developer is thinking about the wider range of typologies, 
dwelling sizes, lot sizes and that inevitably means you get a broader range 
of people and household types into these areas compared to development 
that is 90% identical four bedroom, two bathroom type of houses. I think 
that the inclusionary zoning does that and also includes the retained 
affordable where you definitely get groups of people living in an area that 
is very hard to imagine where you would ever get that mix without that 
(inclusionary zoning) mechanism.”     
Source: Auckland Council Official 
“I definitely think the inclusionary zoning concept is an effective tool to 
encourage more integrated developments probably for the fact that you 
don’t end up with 5 houses, in a 50 unit development with a 10% 
inclusionary zoning requirement, at the back of the development or in a 
down area. I think it (inclusionary zoning) is one of the hallmarks for the 
housing foundation, it is one of the key aspects to produce social 
inclusionary development through place making of physical environment 
and how it helps people connect, talk, live together, communicate and 
support each other.”       
Source: Auckland Land Developer 
It can be inferred from the above views of the stakeholders that inclusionary 
housing certainly is a mechanism that can promote social integration within a 
development. 
The PAUP required affordable housing units to be provided ‘on-site’, where 
required. A research study by the Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning 
Research and University of Sheffield (2005) concluded that using S106 




mixed communities through the on-site provision of affordable housing with 
market-rate development units. Its findings revealed that there are pros and cons 
of having on-site affordable units. The positive aspects are that mixed 
communities will be formed as a result of integrating affordable units with 
market-rate units, which otherwise wouldn’t have been the case without S106 
agreements. The traditional affordable units tend to be small brownfield sites, ex 
local authority land or both. On the contrary, the study found that providing 
affordable units ‘off-site’ delivered more numbers of affordable units than on-site. 
However, if a greenfield housing development contributed off-site units and these 
units are then delivered on traditional, small brownfield infill sites this scenario is 
less likely to satisfy the mixed communities objective. The PAUP also had a 
provision to provide off-site affordable units through resource consent but had 
stricter provisions to do that. These provisions relate to  
a. The alternative site is to be in close proximity, within 1km, and offer a 
superior outcome in terms of access to services and transport and 
community mix. 
b. The developer (applicant) must enter to a legal agreement with a 
community housing provider who can demonstrate that on-site provision 
will not meet their operational requirements and that an off-site location 
will deliver a superior outcome in terms of the number, mix and/or on-
going management of the required retained affordable housing. 
One other concern that was discussed in the study, and also relevant to New 
Zealand context, is developers tended to prefer placing affordable housing in one 
block ‘in the least desirable part of the site’ or ‘in the back corner’ and in some 
cases the design and size of the affordable units were inferior to the market ones. 
This is along the lines of the views of Auckland land developer as stated above. 
This issue was addressed in the PAUP where one of the policies required 
providing retained affordable housing that is similar in external design to market 
rate housing within the development and that is located throughout the 
development.        
 Recommendation - 6: 




5. Chapter 5 - Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this research is to evaluate the approach taken by Auckland 
Council in regard to provision of affordable housing in revoking the inclusionary 
zoning provisions in the Unitary Plan. In order to address this objective, this 
research has been guided by three research questions. This research will be 
concluded by answering these research questions, followed by a brief explanation 
of each recommendation as proposed in chapter 4. 
5.2 Answering the research questions 
To what extent will the current legislation support inclusionary zoning? 
The first research question related to the legislative dimension and sought to 
understand the current legislative context applicable for affordable housing and 
inclusionary zoning in New Zealand and Auckland, and the extent to which these 
legislative aspects support inclusionary zoning. To answer this question, it is first 
required to understand the concept of affordable housing through inclusionary 
zoning and the theories behind this mechanism. From the international overview 
of the concept it is understood that inclusionary zoning can be considered as one 
of the mechanisms to promote affordable housing. An overview of the housing 
legislation that applied in New Zealand was also discussed to understand the 
historic trend. This research also uncovered that inclusionary zoning is not new to 
New Zealand. QLDC have already tried to implement this concept through a plan 
change. Whilst they survived a legal challenge to justify this concept under the 
RMA, they couldn’t survive the decisions made in the political realm. The PAUP 
has seen the introduction of inclusionary zoning provisions that were similar to 
the provisions introduced in QLDC’s plan change. However, the Independent 
Hearings Panel did not consider affordable housing to be within the jurisdiction of 
Auckland Unitary Plan as the panel argued that it is not possible to distinguish 
plan effects on price (e.g. density rules) from non-plan effects (e.g. market effects, 
economy etc). Therefore, a price control through land use regulations would not 
be within the intent of the RMA.  
This research has also studied the provisions of the recent legislation, HASHA 




were also considered and it concluded that whilst this new legislation enabled 
affordable units by applying the inclusionary zoning provisions under the PAUP, 
this proved not to have much impact on housing affordability in Auckland. A 
community housing development that proceeded under the HASHA Act was 
studied as part of this research and the land developer of this development stated 
that apart from a quicker consenting process there were no other benefits received. 
The NPS-UDC was also considered as part of this research and its provisions 
were compared against the Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities 
Act. The analysis proved that the latter had a direct link to the provision of 
affordable housing, whilst the former only focuses on increases in housing supply. 
Murphy (2015) examined the relationship between housing supply and housing 
prices and affordability. He concluded that policies that solely focus on increasing 
housing supply may not increase housing affordability.    
What are the economic impacts that developers face with IZ? 
The second research question related to the economic dimension that sought to 
understand the economic impacts of inclusionary zoning on land developers. 
Given there is limited information available to understand the developer’s 
economic consideration relating to developments that proceeded under the PAUP 
or the current Auckland Unitary Plan (in part), this research relied on the analysis 
carried out by Dr. Murphy and Dr. Rehm. Murphy and Rehm analyzed the 
inclusionary zoning provisions both on greenfield and brownfields areas and 
concluded that introducing this concept would not economically affect any 
developer. One of the research findings was that implementing inclusionary 
zoning in brownfield areas is more complex than greenfield areas. Auckland 
Council in their section 32 analysis considered Murphy and Rehm’s analysis to 
justify inclusionary zoning provisions introduced in the PAUP. 
To what extent will IZ result in better socio-cultural outcome? 
The third and final question related to socio-cultural dimension that sought to 
understand the impact of inclusionary zoning policies from a socio-cultural 
perspective. In order to answer this question, the author relied on primary data 
collected through the stakeholder interviews and the provisions of the PAUP. It 




effective tool to encourage socially integrated developments. It was concluded 
that the provisions in the PAUP, with inclusionary zoning requirements, had 
extensively addressed the common concerns faced by the developers.  
5.3 Recommendations 
Six recommendations were developed from the findings of the analysis as 
discussed in chapter 4. These recommendations seek to provide some solutions to 
utilize inclusionary zoning policies to secure more affordable housing in New 
Zealand, especially Auckland. Four out of six recommendations apply to central 
government as these relate to legislation amendments that are advocated by the 
central government. The other two apply to Auckland Council and would require 
amendments to the Auckland Unitary Plan. 
5.3.1 Recommendations for Central Government 
Recommendation - 1: 
Territorial Authorities should recognize the fact that affordable housing can be 
considered under the RMA.  
In chapters 2 and 4 it was discussed that whilst case law has established that 
affordable housing and inclusionary zoning can be considered under the RMA, 
not many territorial or unitary authorities are coming forward to implement this 
concept as they still fear legal challenges. Central government must take the 
initiative to promote the inclusionary zoning concept and encourage local 
authorities to focus more on affordable housing as part of their Long Term Plans 
and District Plans. 
Recommendation - 2: 
The NPS-UDC should explicitly provide reference and make provisions for 
affordable housing.   
As discussed in chapter 4, the current operative NPS-UDC does not contain 
explicit reference to urban redevelopment proposals or to provision of affordable 
housing. As discussed in section 5.2 above, solely increasing the supply of houses 
will not result in reduced house prices. Introducing policies relating to affordable 
housing in the NPS-UDC will enable local authorities to give effect to this NPS in 




Recommendation - 3: 
Explicit legislation to address affordable housing, such as the Affordable 
Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities Act or HASHA Act, be introduced. 
This recommendation can be considered as an alternative to recommendation – 2. 
If the government believes that specific provisions to affordable housing should 
not form part of the NPS-UDC, then they can consider introducing legislation 
similar to the Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities Act or 
HASHA Act for Auckland. Whilst the HASHA Act is still effective in other 
regions of New Zealand, the Auckland Housing Accord was revoked in May 
2017. The literature review in chapter 2 and analysis in chapter 4 demonstrated 
that both these statutes contributed to affordable housing through inclusionary 
zoning, to some extent. Honing these provisions to suit the current state of 
affordable housing and provisions of Unitary Plan in Auckland could play a major 
role in delivering more affordable housing.         
Recommendation - 4: 
Introduce a section in the RMA that explicitly requires territorial authorities to 
mandate a mutual agreement with developers as a means to mitigate any adverse 
effects from the development that will have a positive impact on the local 
community. 
This recommendation would require/enable territorial authorities to enter into an 
agreement with the developer if the former believes the development would cause 
a significant impact to the area and community. This is a practice followed in the 
UK under Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Whilst this 
practice is still being followed in Queenstown to secure affordable housing units 
in the form of stakeholder deeds, this is totally voluntary and the developer may 
choose not to enter into an agreement if he/she believes there will be negative 
economic impact on the development. Developers will be bound to enter into an 
agreement if this process is formalized through the RMA. These agreements need 
not solely relate to affordable housing, they can include aspects relating to matters 






5.3.2 Recommendations for Auckland Council  
Recommendation - 5: 
Adopt different provisions for inclusionary zoning policy requirements for 
greenfield and brownfield areas. 
As discussed in chapter 4, implementing inclusionary zoning provisions are more 
complex for brownfield areas when compared with greenfield areas. This usually 
discourages developers from providing affordable housing units in brownfield 
areas. An option is to provide incentives to developers as part of mutual 
agreement between council as suggested in recommendation 4. 
Recommendation - 6: 
Re-introduce to the affordable housing provisions stated in the PAUP. 
The research analysis has established that the provisions to promote affordable 
housing through the PAUP have proved a success, especially with the socio-
cultural outcomes. On-site provision of affordable housing created mixed 
communities by integrating market and affordable units on one site, both through 
retained and relative affordable housing. Hence, it is suggested that reverting to 
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Appendix A – Information Sheet to stakeholders 
UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Affordable Housing through Inclusionary Zoning – Case of Auckland 
Introduction 
I am a graduate student pursuing a Master of Environmental Planning at the 
University of Waikato. As part of my Masters, I am required to complete a thesis 
and the topic I selected is “Affordable Housing through Inclusionary Zoning – 
The case of Auckland”. The main aim of this research is to evaluate the approach 
Auckland Council has taken to adopt Inclusionary Zoning to help meet the 
affordable housing requirements in Auckland. I will be analysing Council 
officers’ and developers’ views on the effect of adopting Inclusionary Zoning as 
an approach in the Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan. To undertake a comparative 
study, I have selected Auckland and Queenstown District, where a similar 
approach has been adopted.  
Interviews  
I aim to conduct four interviews with individuals that approximately last for 30 to 
45 minutes in length. These interviews will mostly be semi-structured which 
allows for new ideas to be brought up during the interview stage based on your 
response to the interview schedule. Your opinions play a pivotal role in my 
findings for this research.  
Your participation in this research is very valuable and is highly appreciated. I 
intend to audio record the interviews so that I have accurate record of your 
comments and opinions. 
Your rights as a participant   
You are not obliged to participate in this research, it is totally voluntary. If you 
choose to do so, you have the right to: 
 Refuse to answer any question(s) 




 Request me to delete any material that is provided, if any 
 Decline to be audio recorded and request the recorder to be turned off 
at any time 
 Ask any questions about the research at any time during your 
participation 
Confidentiality  
All the information will be recorded through a device that is capable of recording 
good quality information. This recorded information will be kept secure at all 
times. There will be no other person handling the information apart from me. All 
the recorded information will be stored in my laptop and also in an external hard 
drive. Storing in an external hard drive is just a preventive measure in case my 
computer gets a technical fault. Both the laptop and external hard drive will be 
protected by a password which will not be disclosed to anyone. All the recorded 
information will be used for five years, after which the information will be deleted 
permanently from both my laptop and external hard drive. It is my intention not to 
disclose your identity. Unless stated, I will use pseudonyms during my analysis 
stage. It must be noted that even though pseudonyms will be used, there is a 
possibility that you may be identified through your role at the Council or through 
the housing development project you are undertaking.  
A copy of your transcript will be sent through an email after the interview for you 
to amend any portion of the interview. Only upon written confirmation of 
information provided will I be using it for my analysis purposes. Your copy of the 
transcript will not be sent to any other person apart from you. I am aiming to start 
the analysis within seven days of confirming your transcripts. I will keep you 
informed when analysis begins. 
This research project has been approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of 
Waikato. Any questions about the ethical conduct of this research may be sent to 
the Secretary of the Committee, email fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz, postal address, 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Te Kura Kete Aronui, University of Waikato, 





The results of this research will be used as part of my Masters Thesis. Three 
copies of the thesis will be produced, two in print and one online. The findings of 
this research may also be used in other publications, conference presentations, and 
seminars, as well as pedagogic materials.  
Next step 
If you would like to participate in this research I will contact you in a week and 
provide you with the consent form and interview schedule. I will be able to 
answer any questions you have about this research or alternatively you can contact 
my supervisor at the below mentioned details; 
Ravi Teja Ayyagari         Kate Mackness 
ayyagari.ravi15@gmail.com        Lecturer, Environmental Planning 
0212388471          07 837 9165 








Appendix B – Participant Consent Form 
UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Name of person interviewed: _______________________________________ 
I have received a copy of the Information Sheet describing the research project. 
Any questions that I have relating to the research have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I understand that I can ask further questions about the research at any 
time during my participation, and that I can withdraw my participation at any time 
until analysis on the data I provided commences. It is the researcher’s 
responsibility to inform me when the analysis has begun. Should I wish to 
withdraw any of my comments, I will advise the researcher in writing. 
During the interview, I understand that I do not have to answer questions unless I 
am happy to talk about the topic. I can stop the interview at any time, and I can 
ask to have the recording device turned off at any time.  
When I sign this consent form, I will retain ownership of my interview, but I give 
consent for the researcher to use the interview for the purposes of the research 
outlined in the Information Sheet.  
I understand that my identity will remain confidential in the presentation of the 
research findings, unless I state otherwise. 
Please complete the following checklist.  Tick [] the 
appropriate box for each point.  
YES NO 
[I wish to view the transcript of the interview.]   
[I wish to receive a copy of the findings.]   






Participant :   Researcher :  
Signature :  Signature :  
















Appendix C – Interview Schedule 
Semi Structured Interview Schedule – Council Officer – Auckland Council 
This schedule outlines questions which I intend to ask during our interview. You 
have the choice to omit any question and are welcome to raise any issue that is not 
covered in this schedule. Your thoughts on this topic are very valuable. 
Legal Dimension 
1. When did Auckland Council adopt Inclusionary Zoning (IZ)? 
2. What measures were adopted to implement IZ? 
3. How will IZ operate? 
4. Does Auckland Council provide any incentives to developers who use the 
IZ mechanism? If so, what are these incentives? 
5. What are the experiences faced by Planners during processing of resource 
consents when applications relating to IZ are lodged? 
6. Is there any monitoring mechanism for  
a. Land price 
b. Housing price 
c. Location of projects 
d. Building size and quality of affordable units 
7. How does this monitoring mechanism work? 
8. To what extent, in your opinion, does the current legislation support 
Inclusionary Zoning?  
Economic Dimension 
9. Do you consider that the introduction of IZ instilled trust and confidence 
in land developers? Please explain. 
10. What is the effect on commercial housing prices for projects with and 
without Inclusionary Zoning? 






12. Has the concept of Inclusionary Zoning considered the Principles of 
Treaty of Waitangi? If so, how? 
13. Do you think Inclusionary Zoning is an effective tool to encourage more 
socially integrated developments? 
14. The Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan (PAUP) has provision to provide 
affordable units not in the subject development but anywhere within the 
vicinity of the development. What are the advantages and disadvantages 
of this approach? Do you think this approach would support increased 
social integration?  
 
 






Semi Structured Interview Schedule – Council Officer – Queenstown Lakes 
District Council 
This schedule outlines questions which I intend to ask during our interview. You 
have the choice to omit any question and are welcome to raise any issue that is not 
covered in this schedule. Your thoughts on this topic are very valuable. 
Legal Dimension 
1. When did Queenstown Lakes District Council adopt the linkage 
mechanism? 
2. What measures were adopted to implement the linkage mechanism? 
3. How will the measures operate? 
4. Does Queenstown Lakes District Council provide any incentives to 
developers to use the linkage mechanism? If so, what are these 
incentives? 
5. What are the experiences of Planners during processing of resource 
consents when these sorts of applications are lodged? 
6. How is the linkage mechanism enforced in a resource consent 
application? 
7. Is there any monitoring mechanism for  
a. Land price 
b. Housing price 
c. Location of projects 
d. Building size and quality of affordable units 
8. How does this monitoring mechanism work? 
9. To what extent, in your opinion, does the current legislation support the 
linkage mechanism?  
Economic Dimension 
10. Do you consider that the introduction of linkage mechanism instilled trust 




11. What is the effect on commercial housing price in projects with and 
without linkage mechanism? 
12. What is the effect of linkage mechanism on land value? 
Social Dimension 
13. Has the concept of linkage mechanism considered the Principles of 
Treaty of Waitangi? If so, how?  
14. Do you think the linkage mechanism is an effective tool to encourage 
more socially integrated developments? 






Semi Structured Interview Schedule – Land Developer – Auckland 
This schedule outlines questions which I intend to ask during our interview. You 
have the choice to omit any question and are welcome to raise any issue that is not 
covered in this schedule. Your thoughts on this topic are very valuable. 
Legal Dimension 
1. What is your opinion about the introduction of the Inclusionary Zoning 
(IZ)? In your opinion, is it understandable? 
2. Do you receive any cost offsets or incentives from Auckland Council in 
relation to IZ? If so, what are they? 
3. What is your experience with Auckland Council in implementing IZ 
when you lodged your resource consent application? 
4. Are you aware of any monitoring mechanisms regarding 
a. Land price 
b. Housing price 
c. Location of projects 
d. Building size and quality of affordable units 
5. Do you know how these mechanisms work? If so, please explain. 
6. What kind of improvements, if any, could be done by Auckland Council 
in implementing IZ? 
Economic Dimension 
7. Have you been able to fulfil mandatory requirements of the IZ rule? 
a. If yes, how are you able to do it? 
b. If not, why? 
8. What is the effect of IZ on land value? 
Social Dimension 
9. Do you think Inclusionary Zoning is an effective tool to encourage more 




10. The Proposed Auckland Unitary Plan (PAUP) has provision to provide 
affordable units not in the subject development but anywhere within the 
vicinity of the development. What are the advantages and disadvantages 
of this approach? Do you think this approach would support increased 
social integration? 
 






Semi Structured Interview Schedule – Land Developer – Queenstown 
This schedule outlines questions which I intend to ask during our interview. You 
have the choice to omit any question and are welcome to raise any issue that is not 
covered in this schedule. Your thoughts on this topic are very valuable. 
Legal Dimension 
1. What is your opinion about the introduction of the linkage mechanism? In 
your opinion, is it understandable? 
2. Do you receive any cost offsets or incentives from Queenstown Lakes 
District Council in relation to the linkage mechanism? If so, what are 
they? 
3. What was your experience with Queenstown Lakes District Council in 
implementing the linkage mechanism when you lodged your resource 
consent application? 
4. Are you aware of any monitoring mechanisms regarding 
a. Land price 
b. Housing price 
c. Location of projects 
d. Building size and quality of affordable units 
5. Do you know how these mechanisms work? 
6. What kind of improvements, if any, could be made by Queenstown Lakes 
District Council in implementing the linkage mechanism? 
Economic Dimension 
7. Have you been able to fulfil mandatory requirements of the linkage 
mechanism rule? 
a. If yes, how are you able to do it? 
b. If not, why? 






9. Do you think linkage mechanism is an effective tool to encourage more 
socially integrated developments? 
 
 
Thank you for your time in participating in this research 
 
 
 
